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Three Essays on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)
Ruoke Yang
This dissertation presents three essays in financial economics with regards to corporate
social responsibility and ratings. The first essay develops the first model for the CSR rat-
ing agency who has incentives to shirk while the rated firms have incentives to manipulate
information through deceptive public relations (greenwash). Depending on the size of the
socially responsible investor base and its composition, three possible regimes can be inferred
from the model. The first one is where the rating agency is catering to mainly a large group
of sophisticated SR investors who compensate the rating agency for the value of information.
The second one is where the rating agency is catering to mainly a large group of trusting
SR investors who compensate the rating agency for the value of institutional certification.
In either of these two regimes, the weight of the large group of SR investors should gener-
ate higher market valuations for higher-rated firms that motivate firm managers to perform
greenwashing. The third regime is where there are just too few SR investors to justify the
effort to produce informative signals and to drive apart market valuations for rated firms.
The second essay investigates the empirical predictions of the model described in the
first essay. I challenge the conventional wisdom of commercial CSR ratings being infor-
mative in a first attempt to understand how this ratings market operates. Using a novel
difference-in-difference identification strategy, I show ratings significantly decreased for firms
targeted by a regulatory crackdown on informational manipulation that inflates ratings. I
find that better environmental ratings predict worse future corporate behavior via a novel
set of benchmarks (i.e. penalties, lawsuits, and media coverage) while neither environmental
nor social ratings appear to offer incremental predictive value beyond size and other stan-
dard firm characteristics. Higher-rated firms are associated with higher market valuations
relative to their lower-rated counterparts. My findings point to a world in which the ratings
business is primarily catering to a large group of trusting investors who buy ratings not for
the value of information but for the value of institutional certification.
The third essay examines the ratings of a recently emerged rating agency competitor
and find its ratings are of no better predictive quality. I introduce a novel set of measures,
corporate badness (CB) ratings, for corporate environmental and social performance. In
contrast to the leading commercial ratings, worse CB ratings correctly predict more future
corporate bad behavior out-of-sample. These CB ratings provide a way to study ratings
disagreement, which can be used to disentangle greenwashing from the other information
contained in the leading commercial CSR ratings.
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1. A Model of the CSR Rating Agency
1.1. Introduction
The incorporation of environmental and social considerations in the portfolio choices of
investors has become increasingly popular in recent years. From what was originally a niche
portfolio strategy around the turn of the century, socially responsible investments in 2016 in
the U.S. are comprised of a wide array of products that are valued at roughly 8.72 trillion
dollars and make up around 20 percent of total assets under management (US Forum for
Responsible and Sustainable Investment 2016). The recent level of growth marks well over
a fourteen-fold increase from what SRI was in 1995 (US Forum for Responsible and Sustain-
able Investment 2016). Alongside the massive growth in socially responsible investments,
corporate social responsibility (CSR) ratings have become prominent as many investors rely
on ratings to gauge the environmental and social performance of firms they are investing in.1.
Nevertheless, for all the interest CSR has recently received and the amount of money at
stake, the market for socially responsible investments remains poorly understood. One grow-
ingly loud criticism is that it is not clear what CSR ratings measure and how informative they
are. For instance, questions among investors surfaced regarding the environmental ratings
of British Petroleum (BP) and Volkswagen in the years leading up to their environmental
fiascos.2 Another concern is corporate greenwashing, a form of informational manipulation
by firms who manufacture deceptive or misleading positive information about their CSR
1Many examples are abound. Dimensional Fund Advisors offer socially responsible investment products
based on ratings on environmental and social performance from MSCI.
2These questions appeared during the ‘Outcomes, Measurements, and Metrics’ session at the Yale Impact
Investing Conference 2018. For example, Andrew Siwo from Colonial Consulting demanded to know whether
CSR ratings told investors anything useful about future corporate environmental and social troubles similar
to how credit ratings are supposed to be informative to investors about future credit events.
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performance.3
Here, I ask the question: what are the economic mechanisms that can lead to distortions
in the informational quality of the ratings? This chapter addresses the question in a first
attempt to study how this CSR ratings market operates.
This chapter presents a model of the CSR rating agency, the first of which I am aware,
whose business can come from two potential groups of socially responsible (SR) investors.4
The first group is made up of sophisticated investors who have social preferences but face
uncertainty about firm type (e.g. dirty firm, clean firm). This creates a role for the rating
agency. These investors infer rationally ratings quality and only pay if ratings are informa-
tive. The second group is made up of trusting investors with the same stated preferences
as the first group. However, they differ from the first group in that they accept ratings at
face value because trusting investors buy ratings for the value of institutional certification.
The existence of trusting investors can arise from agency problems with the managers of
institutional investments.
With only sophisticated SR investors in the baseline model, the monopolist rating agency
faces a choice between exerting costly effort (and earning a positive revenue) and shirking
(and earning nothing). Naturally, if there are too few socially conscious investors, the rating
agency will not choose high effort. A general equilibrium outcome of the model states that,
initially, increasing the number of socially conscious investors increases the total revenue of
the rating agency. But the increase occurs up to a point: beyond some point, the total
revenue falls as the fees paid per investor is decreasing with the number of SR investors.
3A May 2010 article in Mother Jones chronicles the huge creative efforts (on the order of millions or
sometimes billions of dollars) that BP devoted to greenwashing its image prior to its scandal.
4I will use ‘socially responsible’ (SR) and ‘socially conscious’ interchangeably throughout the paper to
describe investors who care about more than just cash flows and exhibit social preferences in their utility
functions.
2
This decrease in fees comes as more SR investors increase the price of good-rated shares
relative to bad-rated ones in equilibrium, thus lower their expected returns, which makes
identifying such firms less desirable. In other words, too much demand from socially respon-
sible investors can result in its becoming too expensive to be socially responsible. This makes
it harder for the rating agency to extract surplus from informed socially responsible investors.
Confronted by a large body of socially conscious investors, firm managers care about
ratings because good (bad) ratings would raise (lower) share prices and decrease (increase)
the cost of capital. Firm managers who anticipate future problems can engage in costly
propaganda efforts (greenwashing) to manipulate the information set available to the rating
agency. Manipulation by no means guarantees a good rating, but it may increase the likeli-
hood of obtaining one.
With the addition of trusting socially conscious investors in the extended model, I show
that the incentives for the rating agency to exert effort is attenuated as the number of trust-
ing investors increase within the population of SR investors. In the extreme case where all
the SR investors are trusting, the rating agency has nothing to gain from exerting effort.
Meanwhile, widely disparate market valuations for good-rated and bad-rated firms create
strong incentives for firms to manipulate, especially as any ratings they receive are accepted
at face value.
The model generates three potential regimes for the CSR ratings business. In the first
regime, the ratings business is mainly driven by a large group of sophisticated SR investors
who buy ratings for the value of information. In the second regime, the rating agency serves
a large group of trusting SR investors who buy ratings for the value of institutional certifi-
cation. Both regimes imply higher market values for firms with higher ratings that in turn
incentivize firm managers to manipulate. They differ in that the first regime requires ratings
3
to retain some useful information value while the second one does not require ratings to be
informative. The third regime represents the case where socially conscious investors number
too few to move market valuations and to warrant generating informative signals. I turn
to the data to evaluate these implications of the model and distinguish among these three
regimes.
The model of the CSR rating agency connects to the literature on credit rating agencies.
In both settings, there is concern about ratings quality. However, the institutional details
are quite different. Instead of issuers paying for credit ratings, socially conscious investors
are paying for the CSR ratings either because they are sophisticated and desire to become
informed (i.e. the value of information channel) or they are trusting and seek to hold assets
with ratings (i.e. the value of institutional certification channel). Ratings inflation occurs
not from shopping as studied in Bolton, Frexias, and Shapiro (2012) and Skreta and Veld-
kamp (2009) but from the firm manipulating the information observed by the CSR rating
agency. The CSR rating agency has incentives to shirk but no incentives to lie. Instead, it
is firms’ manipulation that can lead to biased CSR ratings. Furthermore, high-rated CSR
securities do not create any of the regulatory compliance benefit found with investing in
securities with strong credit ratings as examined by Opp, Opp, and Harris (2013).
The model introduced here also adds to the growing list of theoretical works on corpo-
rate social responsibility and socially responsible investing (Hart and Zingales 2017; Magill,
Quinzii, and Rochet 2015; Baron 2007; Heinkel, Kraus, and Zechner 2001). These papers
revolve around normative questions such as whether corporations should be socially respon-
sible or how corporations can be socially responsible, which trace back to Friedman (1970),
who argued that the ‘social responsibility of business is to increase its profits’. Their models
assume that investors are not being deceived.
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1.2. A Model of the CSR Rating Agency
To establish a theoretical framework for the empirical analysis to follow, I introduce a
model that formally explores the economic incentives of the CSR rating agency to produce
informative signals and the incentives for the firm to perform actions that affect these signals.
The model I present synthesizes, from two very different parts of the finance literature, the
ideas of two works, one by Bolton, Frexias and Shapiro (2012) on credit rating agencies and
one by Heinkel, Kraus, and Zechner (2001) on portfolio choice involving socially responsible
investors.
I consider a simple model for the problem of the rating agency, which serves a vital func-
tion in the market for socially responsible investments by reducing the information asym-
metry between firms and investors. Unlike the credit ratings business studied by Bolton,
Frexias and Shapiro (2012) and many others, CSR ratings are not plagued by the conflicts
of interest that arise from issuer payments for ratings as both good and bad CSR ratings are
sold in a single package to investors. Nevertheless, the signals coming from the CSR rating
agency are not necessarily free from inaccuracies caused by bad incentives. The inaccuracy
in this setting arises not from the incentives for the rating agency to lie but from incentives
for the rating agency to shirk given the discretion that the rating agency has over the effort
it exerts. Moreover, in Bolton, Frexias and Shapiro (2012), the credit rating agency is not
subject to informational manipulation by the rated firms whose actions are constrained by
the enormous legal consequences for financial fraud. Despite the huge amount of public
interest, statements about corporate greenness or social responsibility are subject to much
less legal scrutiny. Therefore, the option is available for socially irresponsible firms to invest
in deceptive public relations to create favorable ratings. Because investors are paying for
the CSR ratings, the portfolio choice dimension, originally studied by Heinkel, Kraus, and
Zechner (2001) in the case of no informational asymmetry, is salient in this setting.
5
Before I proceed to list the main components of the model, it is important to make clear
that I will model socially responsible investors as agents who experience a penalty in their
utility function that is proportional to their holdings of socially irresponsible firms. This
modeling choice is akin to that of Fama and French (2007) who describe some investors with
tastes for assets based on certain characteristics, which they assume are readily observable.
In Fama and French (2007), these investors obtain direct utility from owning shares chosen
along some characteristic. Heinkel, Kraus, and Zechner (2001) and a subsequent paper by
Baker, Bergstresser, Serafeim, and Wurgler (2018) take a similar approach.5
The key foundations of the model can be summarized as follows:
1. Investors with social preferences: There exist a body of investors who exhibit pref-
erences for businesses that are socially responsible and who therefore incur disutility from
finding out that their money went into supporting what they regard as a socially harmful
enterprise.
2. Investor-pay regime for ratings: To obtain ratings, socially responsible investors pay
the rating agency a fixed licensing fee. The ratings are then used to screen investments
for characteristics related to corporate social responsibility. These investors can be either
sophisticated or trusting as I will discuss later.
3. Barriers to entry: There are no official barriers to entry, such as legal restrictions, but
reputation and scale are factors that contribute to a de facto monopoly on the commercial
provision and sale of CSR ratings.6
5The paper by Baker, Bergstresser, Serafeim, and Wurgler (2018) is closely related to an empirical analysis
by Flammer (2018). A richer model could specify that socially responsible investors experience disutility
from the externalities in the economy irrespective of whether they own the shares. I consider this approach
in an another work.
6In a separate paper, I study whether competition between rating agencies can improve the quality of
ratings under a duopoly setting. Generally speaking, in a duopoly, rating agencies can compete either on
6
4. The lack of transparency: Ratings come from more or less a black box (for arguably
proprietary reasons). There is no indication of what amount of work was put in to produce
CSR ratings.
5. Informational Manipulation: The rated firms can engage in public relations that in-
troduce positive information about themselves to the rating agency. For the most part, the
absence of serious legal attention (and legal consequences for rated firms) permits this sort
of behavior.
With these features in mind, I analyze the conditions that would lead the rating agency
to exert low versus high effort in the context of a market for socially responsible investments
and study its impact on investors and firms. In the baseline model with a sophisticated
socially responsible investor clientele, the CSR ratings agency seeks to maximize his revenue
from selling to these investors subject to the cost of high effort.7 I find the share price of the
good-rated firm increases with respect to effort while the share price of the bad-rated firm
drops because higher effort translates into better signal quality about the firm for informed
socially responsible investors. Increasing the number of socially responsible investors adds
to the revenue of the rating agency but only up to a point before too much demand drives
down the surplus that the rating agency can obtain from these investors. Socially responsible
investors care about the disutility from owning bad firms.
Consequently, for projects whose required level of financing and future cash flow char-
acteristics are identical, managers of a bad-rated firm (versus a good-rated firm) surrender
a larger part of his share of the project cash flow in order to obtain the necessary project
fees or on informational quality, so the effect of competition on the ratings quality can be ambiguous.
7The rating agency is an independent entity who relies chiefly on public information and does not provide
consulting services that would distort the quality of the ratings via inflation of the ratings for subscribers to
the so-called consultation.
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financing. To avoid being assigned a bad rating, firm managers can self-generate positive
information about their business that influence the technology of the rating agency.
In an extended model, I include trusting socially responsible investors. As the proportion
of trusting SR investors increases, the rating agency faces weaker incentives to exert high
effort and firms respond with more greenwashing. The result is that higher stock prices are
given to higher-rated firms despite the fact that the ratings are uninformative.
For the baseline model, there are three actors of interest: two types of firms, rating
agency, and two types of investors. I will describe the details of each.
1.2.1. Firms
A firm can be one of two types: the good type g that will experience a stakeholder re-
lations problem with probability zero and the bad type b that will experience a stakeholder
relations problem with probability one.
Both types, for the sake of simplicity in the analysis, have identical financing and cash
flow characteristics in that each firm has a project that requires financing Fproject to produce
cash flows normally distributed with mean µc and variance σ
2
c . Assume µc > Fproject.
Funding for the good-rated (bad-rated) firm is achieved by issuing Nrg (Nrb) shares of
the future cash flows to the public. N is the total number of shares for a given project. Prg ,
Prb are the prices per share for the good-rated and bad-rated firms, respectively.









and the manager’s share of the cash flow for a bad-rated firm is
(1− Nrb
N





There exist I investors who exhibit constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) with risk
aversion parameter A and are either socially responsible, denoted as SR, or socially neutral,
denoted as nSR (i.e. not socially responsible). Let ISR and InSR, which sum to I, be the
number of investors of the SR and nSR types. The ISR SR investors are different from the
InSR nSR investors in that the former cares about more than merely financial returns in
that SR investors experience disutility ξ from holding firms that turn out have stakeholder
relations problems.
As a given firm’s type is ex ante not known to the other parties, investors assign a com-
mon prior belief to it. That is, a firm is good with probability λ i.e. P(ω = g) = λ, where
λ ∈ (0, 1). This probability is exogenous and can be seen as to capture the distribution
of firm types).8 In making their investment decisions, socially responsible investors have
an information choice. They can choose to be uninformed (i.e. uSR) by relying on solely
their prior beliefs or to be informed (i.e. iSR) by forming new beliefs based on a combina-
tion of public information and private information, which is discussed in the next subsection.9
8Bolton, Frexias and Shapiro (2012) consider the case where the probability of a firm being of good type
is one half. Throughout this section, I will take the same approach by setting λ = 1/2 in order to allow for
the current setup of firms.
9Socially responsible investors (the sophisticated type in this baseline model) do not directly observe the
9
xnSR,rg , xnSR,rb , xiSR,rg , xiSR,rb , xuSR,rg , and xuSR,rb are the individual investor allocations
by firm and investor type. For markets to clear,
InSRxnSR,rg + IiSRxiSR,rg + IuSRxuSR,rg = Nrg (3)
InSRxnSR,rb + IiSRxiSR,rb + IuSRxuSR,rb = Nrb (4)
.
1.2.3. Rating Agency
Unlike investors, the rating agency has a technology that allows it to obtain either a good
private signal θg or, a bad one, θb on a given firm. There is some discretion by the rating
agency over the quality of the technology, which depends on its effort e ∈ eL, eH , where eL = 12
and 1
2
< eH < 1. One can think of this technology as the rating agency having superior
potential resources but using these resources (e.g. number of analysts, quality of analysis,
breadth and depth of diligence, meetings with company officials) is costly. Specifically, for a
given e at a cost of c(e− 1
2
), where c(0) = 0, c′(·) > 0, and c′′(·) > 0,
P(θ = θg|ω = g) = P(θ = θb|ω = b) = e (5)
and
P(θ = θg|ω = b) = P(θ = θb|ω = g) = 1− e.10 (6)
technology of the rating agency or the effort e but have the sophistication to properly infer it from other
information and their understanding of incentives.
10This definition of the technology of the rating agency comes from Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro (2012).
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At minimal effort e = eL, the rating agency generates an uninformative signal (i.e. if
an investor were to see the signal, it would not change his prior). At high effort eH , the
rating agency obtains a more useful signal about the firm’s type. Since there are none of the
conflicts of interest found in, for instance, the credit ratings literature that would cause the
rating agency to lie, the rating agency assigns rg (rb) for private signals θg (θb). F1 is the
licensing fee paid per investor.
The timing of the moves of the model are listed as follows:
[0. Firm managers choose their amounts of manipulation.]
1. The rating agency chooses to exert e ∈ eL, eH at a cost c(e − 12). The rating agency
receives the private signal θ ∈ θL, θH , reports respectively r ∈ rL, rH , and sets its fee.
2. Sophisticated [and trusting] socially responsible investors, based on their individual
perceived utilities of becoming informed versus remaining uninformed, decide whether or not
they want to buy the ratings.
3. Given their information sets, all investors submit their demands and markets clear.
4. Cash flows are realized and ξ is experienced for the socially responsible investors.
Note: Brackets [...] indicate that these components are extensions not found in the base-
line model.
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The more effort the rating agency exerts to produce its private signal the more confident
is the informed socially responsible investor about the firm type.11 If e = eL, then choosing
to become informed lands investors with the same prior they started out with.

























(IiSRP(ω = b|r = rb) + IuSRP(ω = b))) (8)
.
Proof.
The proof is in Appendix A. 
Proposition 1 establishes a link between the quality of CSR ratings and the prices of rated
securities. More effort put in by the rating agency generates a more accurate signal about
the firm’s type, which in turn causes informed socially responsible investors to become more
confident about tilting their portfolio towards good-rated securities and away from bad-rated
ones. Consequently, the price of good-rated shares increases with respect to effort while the
price of bad-rated shares decreases. A bad-rated firm whose project is financially identical to
that of a good-rated firm is compelled to give up more shares of its cash flows to the public
11Since P(ω = g) = λ and P(θ = θg|ω = g) = P(θ = θb|ω = b) = e, the posterior beliefs of the informed




in order to get the requisite amount of financing. Stronger priors about a given firm’s type
also boost confidence for both types of socially responsible investors and affect prices in a
similar way. 12
As for fees, there are two dimensions to consider. The first one is the per investor fee F1,
which is endogenously determined by setting F1 = UiSR−UuSR (i.e. the prospective socially
responsible investor is indifferent to purchasing ratings and becoming informed versus not
purchasing ratings and remaining uninformed). The second dimension is total fees or the
rating agency’s revenue, which is IiSRF1. The rating agency chooses effort e that maximizes





For high effort, it must be that IiSR is equal to the total number of socially responsible
investors in equilibrium. Otherwise, the rating agency can always lower its fee by a negligible
amount and get every socially responsible investor to subscribe.
The fee per investor is hard to express analytically. Figure 1 provides a numerical illus-
tration of how the fee paid per socially responsible investor is decreasing with the number
of socially responsible investors.13 Naturally, because the rating agency is paid for helping
socially conscious investors avoid bad firms, the rating agency earns a higher fee when these
investors exhibit a stronger aversion to social irresponsibility. Similarly, Figure 2 shows that
more investor interest in social responsibility generates higher market values for good-rated
firms relative to bad-rated ones. The ratio of good-rated to bad-rated is stronger when so-
12Intuitively, higher values of disutility ξ and a higher number of socially responsible investors relative to
total investors too pushes the prices of good-rated and bad-rated away from each other.
13For Figures 1, 2, and 3, I use the following parameter values: F = 3, N = 100, e = 0.75, µc = 5, σc = 2,
A = 0.01, and ξ = 10 (or 8). The qualitative results are not specific to this choice of parameter values.
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cially responsible investors care more social irresponsibility.
Figure 3 shows that the total revenue of the rating agency achieves a unique maximum
at intermediate values of IiSR/I. For a given value of eH , the deciding factor for the choice
of effort by the rating agency is the number of socially responsible investors.
If there are too few socially responsible investors, then the rating agency does not have
enough demand for its ratings to warrant putting out high effort. On the other hand, too
much demand from socially responsible investors makes shares of the good-rated firm ex-
tremely expensive (i.e. lower expected returns) relative to those of the bad-rated one as
shown in Figure 2. Here, too many socially responsible investors are ‘crowding out’ the
surplus that the rating agency can extract from the informed socially conscious investor and
hence Figure 1 shows the per investor fee F1 becomes lower with an increased presence of
socially responsible investors. There are two disutilities experienced by the socially conscious
investor: the social irresponsibility aversion ξ and lower expected returns.14 By choosing to
become informed, the socially conscious investor is accepting lower expected returns from
allocating more of his or her portfolio towards the higher-priced shares in order to avoid the
social irresponsibility aversion ξ.
Figure 3 displays how the net outcome for the revenue of the rating agency traces out
an inverted U-shaped curve that reaches its highest point at an intermediate value of the
percentage of socially responsible investors. Depending on the level of high effort cost, which
is invariant to the number of socially responsible investors and would appear as a horizon-
tal line in Figure 3, the rating agency would then decide whether or not to exert high effort.15
14Riedl and Smeets (2017) use administrative data and experimental evidence to show that investors are
willing to forgo financial returns in exchange for investing in socially responsible manner.
15Papers like Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) show that socially conscious investors do pay a real financial
cost for being socially responsible, but backing out which firms are socially responsible and which are not
from prices is virtually impossible in practice given the myriad other forces at play that affect asset prices.
Hence, I do not allow for inference from prices. For the sake of completeness, in Appendix E, I consider the
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1.2.4. Greenwashing
The baseline model of the rating agency can be extended to allow for investment in in-
formation manipulation by the firm manager who seeks to improve his chances of obtaining
a good rating as opposed to a bad rating. Let γg and γb denote the amount of manipulation
by the firm manager of type g and type b, respectively, at cost k, where k′ > 0, k′′ > 0.
The modified technology of the rating agency is
P(θ = θg|ω = g) = P(θ = θb|ω = b) = e+ γg − γb (10)
P(θ = θb|ω = g) = P(θ = θg|ω = b) = 1− (e+ γg − γb) (11)
Informed socially conscious investor confidence in the ratings is increasing (decreasing)
with respect to the amount of manipulation by manager of the good (bad) type firm.16
From Equations 7 and 8 in Proposition 1, as γg increases, the gap between the price of the
good-rated firm and the price of the bad-rated firm widens because greater informed socially
conscious investor confidence increases P ∗rg , the price of the good-rated firm, and decreases
P ∗rb , the price of the bad-rated firm. By the same reasoning, as γb increases, the gap between
the price of the good-rated firm and the price of the bad-rated firm narrows because weaker
informed socially conscious investor confidence decreases P ∗rg , the price of the good-rated
firm, and increases P ∗rb , the price of the bad-rated firm. Intuitively, the manager of the bad
case in which investors can make inferences from noisy prices. Allowing investors the option to infer from
noisy prices further reduces the surplus that the rating agency can extract from informed socially responsible
investors.




type firm stands to benefit if informed socially conscious investors are able to infer little to
nothing from the ratings while the manager of the good type firm prefers prices between
good-rated and bad-rated to be farther apart.
Formally, the manager of the bad type firm chooses γb to maximize his expected share
of the cash flow
P(r = rb|ω = b)(1−
Nrb
N





(e+ γg − γb)(1−
Fproject/Prb
N
)µc + (1− (e+ γg − γb))(1−
Fproject/Prg
N
)µc − k(γb) (13)
and the manager of the good type firm chooses γg to maximize his expected share of the
cash flow
P(r = rb|ω = g)(1−
Nrb
N





(1− (e+ γg − γb))(1−
Fproject/Prb
N
)µc + (e+ γg − γb)(1−
Fproject/Prg
N
)µc − k(γg) (15)
.
To better understand how firms manipulate in equilibrium, Figure 4 shows a diagram
depicting the best response manipulations by the good type and the bad type firms. In-
creasing γg supplements the effort of the rating agency, and so the price of the good-rated
becomes even higher relative to the price of the bad-rated. This incentivizes the bad type
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to increase his γb in order to increase his chances of obtaining a good rating. On the other
hand, increasing γb results in the good type doing less γg as prices between good-rated and
bad-rated become closer from the fact that higher γb weakens the technology of the rating
agency. In the case of symmetric costs, the good and bad types choose equal amounts of
manipulation in equilibrium.
Lower rating agency effort shrinks the manipulation in equilibrium because a less precise
technology is less attractive for both firm types to manipulate. Higher effort shifts the best
response lines outward and therefore there is more manipulation by both types in equilibrium.
Relaxing the assumption of symmetric costs results in asymmetric amounts of manipulation.
For example, if the cost of manipulation for the bad type were to increase, as I will discuss
more in the empirical analysis, then the equilibrium will shift to a new equilibrium in the
top right quadrant.17
1.3. The Extended Model with a Trusting Investor Clientele
Not all investors are necessarily sophisticated actors who interpret environmental and
social ratings rationally in a Bayesian manner. Some socially conscious investors are content
to simply screen their investments based on environmental and social ratings.18 Instead of
buying ratings for the value of information, these trusting investors buy ratings for the value
of institutional certification, which can arise from agency problems with the fund managers
who are charged with overseeing the investments of their ultimate investors. Trusting so-
cially conscious investors here accept ratings at face value.
For example, the managers of public pension funds can invest in businesses based on
17In the case of trusting SR investors, the equilibrium manipulation is at the intersection of a flat best
response line for the bad type and a vertical best response line for the good type. This is because prices are
no longer sensitive to effort or manipulation due to the fixed beliefs of trusting SR investors.
18As Bruce Usher has observed, environmental and social ratings have been used as an expedient means
for socially conscious investors to ‘feel good’ about their investment choices.
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environmental ratings regardless of their actual environmental performance in order to pla-
cate constituents who demand these funds ‘go green’ with their investment practices. An
equilibrium can therefore exist in which ratings are not offering useful information about
future corporate behavior as the demand for ratings come from the value of institutional
certification.
The existence of such trusting investors is in line with Bolton, Frexias, and Shapiro
(2012), Skreta and Veldkamp (2009), and Opp, Opp, and Harris (2013) who allow for in-
vestors to neglect to care about the informational content of credit ratings. For credit ratings,
the incentives for investors to perform diligence can be weak when (i) the compensation of
managers of third party investments is affected only slightly by the realized returns of their
investments; (ii) there are mechanical regulatory benefits associated with owning assets of a
certain rating.
With CSR ratings, (i) still applies and the case for trusting investors is even stronger as
the emerging trend of SRI has produced a lot of new investors who have yet to arrive at a
common standard on how CSR ratings should be judged. Whereas defaults are highly visible
corporate events that directly affect payments to investors, the nonpecuniary aspect of CSR
may make it easier for some to overlook situations where ratings are not aligned with the
corporate behavior actually observed.
To see the immediate implications of the value of institutional certification, consider the
extreme scenario where all the socially conscious investors are trusting. In such a scenario,
the ratings can be simultaneously uninformative and still drive apart the market valuations
of the good-rated and bad-rated firms (i.e. set P(ω = g|r = rg) = 1 and P(ω = b|r = rb) = 1
in Equations 7 and 8). Managers in turn would have huge incentives to manipulate their way
to a good rating while the incentives for the rating agency to exert effort diminish. Hence, in
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a world where the rating agency is catering to trusting socially conscious investors, I would
observe 1) higher ratings are not reliable predictors of less future bad corporate behavior; 2)
ratings are manipulated by firms; 3) higher ratings are linked to higher market valuations (to
the extent that there is a sufficiently large number of trusting socially conscious investors).
More formally, let ItSR (IsSR) be the number of trusting (sophisticated) socially respon-
sible investors, who can either be informed IitSR (IisSR) or uninformed IutSR (IusSR). The
new market clearing conditions are
InSRxnSR,rg + IisSRxisSR,rg + IusSRxusSR,rg + IitSRxitSR,rg + IutSRxutSR,rg = Nrg (16)
InSRxnSR,rb + IisSRxisSR,rb + IusSRxusSR,rb + IitSRxitSR,rb + IutSRxutSR,rb = Nrb (17)
.
The prices for the good-rated19 and bad-rated20 take a form similar as before with the
addition of IitSR and IutSR terms.
For a positive number of trusting SR investors, the rating agency no longer receives
zero compensation for low effort. In fact, because trusting SR investors accept ratings
at face value, the ratings are more valuable to them than to their sophisticated counter-
parts. Therefore, the rating agency has to decide between exerting low effort (and receiv-




















A (IitSR + IisSRP(ω = b|r = rb) + (IusSR + IutSR)P(ω = b)))
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ISR(UisSR − UusSR)− c(eH − 12) from selling to ISR investors), which include both sophisti-
cated and trusting types. Note that, because of no price discrimination, the rating agency
can only charge a maximum fee of UisSR − UusSR for the trusting SR investors.21
Figure 5 illustrates how the incentives of the rating agency to exert high effort is decreas-
ing with respect to the proportion of trusting socially responsible investors (out of the total
number of socially responsible investors).22
Several curves in Figure 5 trace out the excess revenue earned by the rating agency (i.e.
total revenue from exerting high effort minus total revenue from exerting low effort). The top
curve refers to the baseline model with only sophisticated investors. When all the socially
responsible investors are sophisticated, the excess revenue is the total revenue because the
rating agency obtains zero for exerting low effort. Around the peak of this curve describes
World 1, where (i) higher ratings predict less future bad corporate behavior; (ii) an increase
in the cost of greenwashing should on average result in lower ratings; (iii) higher-rated firms
should receive higher market valuations than their lower-rated counterparts.
As the percentage of trusting SR investors (out of the total population of SR investors)
increases, the excess revenue earned from high effort monotonically decreases. Intuitively,
increasing the presence of trusting investors who are insensitive to the quality of ratings
weakens incentives for the rating agency to exert high effort. The extreme scenario is World
2, where all (or most) of the SR investors are trusting so there is nothing to be gained from
exerting high effort. World 2 gives the following empirical implications: (i) higher ratings
DO NOT predict less future bad corporate behavior; (ii) an increase in the cost of greenwash-
ing should on average result in lower ratings; (iii) higher-rated firms should receive higher
21Allowing or disallowing price discrimination does not affect the results qualitatively.
22For Figure 5, I use the following parameter values: F = 3, N = 100, e = 0.9, µc = 5, σc = 2, A = 0.01,
ξ = 3.
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market valuations than their lower-rated counterparts.
Finally, if there are just too few SR investors, then the rating agency has no reason to
exert high effort. This is the region denoted by World 3, which sits below the horizontal cost
of high effort line cutting across the middle of the plot. World 3 implies (i) higher ratings DO
NOT predict less future bad corporate behavior; (ii) an increase in the cost of greenwashing
should NOT on average result in lower ratings; (iii) higher-rated firms should NOT receive
higher market valuations than their lower-rated counterparts.
1.4. Conclusion
With the rise in demand to invest in a socially responsible manner comes a massive ap-
petite for ratings that are supposed to reduce the information asymmetry between investors
and firm managers about firm environmental and social performance. Whereas prior re-
search focused on applying ratings to draw inferences about investor motivations for social
responsibility and the impact of social responsibility on financial performance, I investigate
the economic incentives of the rating agency and the rated firms to distort them.
To establish a formal framework, I construct the first model of the CSR rating agency
who is paid by potentially two classes of investors. The first class is comprised of sophisti-
cated SR investors who pay the rating agency to exert effort to produce signals that help
distinguish socially responsible firms from the socially irresponsible ones. The second class
is made up of trusting SR investors who accept ratings at face value for the purpose of
institutional certification.
In the baseline case of only sophisticated SR investors, the rating agency chooses its
costly effort level to maximize profits. If the rating agency shirks and generates uninforma-
tive signals, it receives nothing from these investors. If the rating agency exerts high effort
21
and produces informative signals, it receives positive compensation. The total compensation
technically increases with the number of SR investors but is constrained by the general equi-
librium effect on the surplus that the rating agency can extract from informed SR investors.
Extremely high investor demand for social responsibility makes investing in a socially respon-
sible manner too expensive (because prices are endogenous) and crowds out the fee that the
rating agency obtains from each informed socially responsible investor. Therefore, the total
revenue curve of the rating agency traces out an inverted-U shape respect to the number of
socially responsible investors.
By introducing trusting SR investors, I show that the incentives to produce meaningful
signals are monotonically decreasing as the proportion of SR investors become trusting. The
extreme case is where all the SR investors are trusting and the rating agency stands to
obtain no positive excess revenue from exerting high effort. With a large SR investor base,
regardless of whether they are primarily sophisticated or trusting, higher rated firms should
exhibit higher market valuations. I extend the baseline model to allow for ratings manip-
ulation by firm managers who care about ratings because these ratings affect their cost of
capital. In particular, firms that are privately aware of potential stakeholder problems have
strong motivations to engage in deceptive public relations (greenwashing), which influences
the rating agency to assign favorable ratings.
Depending on the size of the SR investor base and its composition, three possible regimes
can be inferred from the model. The first one is where the rating agency is catering to mainly
a large group of sophisticated SR investors who compensate the rating agency for the value of
information. The second one is where the rating agency is catering to mainly a large group
of trusting SR investors who compensate the rating agency for the value of institutional
certification. In either of these two regimes, the weight of the large group of SR investors
should generate higher market valuations for higher-rated firms that motivate firm managers
22
to perform greenwashing. The third regime is where there are just too few SR investors to
justify the effort to produce informative signals and to drive apart market valuations for
rated firms.
23
























Figure 1.1. Per Investor Fees. This figure plots how fees per investor change as the
number of socially responsible investors increases.
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Ratio of Good−rated Share Price to Bad−rated Share Price
Figure 1.2. Prices of the good-rated versus the bad-rated. This figure plots the
ratio of the price of the good-rated versus the bad-rated as the number of socially responsible
investors increases.
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Total Revenue of the Rating Agency
Figure 1.3. Total Revenue. This figure plots the total revenue of the rating agency as
the number of socially responsible investors increases.
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Figure 1.4. Optimal Manipulations by Good and Bad Type Firms. This diagram
plots the best response manipulation by the good (bad) firm type as denoted by ‘g’ (‘b’) and




Figure 1.5. Excess Revenue of the Rating Agency. This figure plots the excess
revenue (i.e. revenue from exerting high effort minus revenue from exerting low effort) for
various socially responsible investor type compositions. World 1 refers to the regime where
there is a sizable SR investor base comprised of primarily sophisticated SR investors. World 2
refers to the regime where there is a sizable SR investor base comprised of primarily trusting
SR investors. World 3 refers to the regime where the SR investor base is negligible. The
horizontal line across the middle denotes the cost of exerting high effort.
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2. An Empirical Examination of CSR Ratings
2.1. Introduction
In this chapter, I ask several questions: are CSR ratings meaningful signals of corporate
behavior? To what extent are CSR ratings merely a reflection of greenwashing?
Drawing upon sources with data on regulatory violations, major lawsuits, and news expo-
sure to CSR-related incidents, I find that better environmental ratings predict more negative
news related to CSR performance in the future as well as more regulatory penalties and law-
suits. Neither environmental nor social ratings appear to offer incremental predictive value
beyond firm size and other controls.
The amount of greenwashing is endogenous. To properly identify the causal effect of
greenwashing on environmental ratings inflation, I utilize a novel difference-in-difference
identification strategy based on a regulatory intervention by the Federal Trade Commis-
sion (FTC). Specifically, under its historical mandate to protect American consumers, the
FTC instituted a crackdown around the end of 2012 on broad, unqualified marketing claims
made by firms to consumers about the environmental impact and chemical attributes of
their products and services. As the policy targeted communications between firms and con-
sumers, not all firms were equally affected. Firms in the business-to-consumer industries
faced a higher level of regulatory scrutiny and were more impacted than others.23 From
this plausibly exogenous shock to greenwashing (an increase in the cost of greenwashing), I
show that environmental ratings decreased significantly for the treated firms. This implies
that greenwashing was important prior to the intervention. The same difference-in-difference
23Pursuant to the stated objective of the crackdown, virtually all the enforcement actions were against
firms in the business-to-consumer industries.
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analysis from the regulatory intervention show that social ratings shared a slightly weaker
but significant decrease.24
Making further use of the regulatory action at the end of 2012 that imposed a plausibly
exogenous positive shock to the cost of greenwashing, I perform another robustness check
of my model. The model predicts that less greenwashing should be accompanied by an
improvement in the quality of the ratings. I compare the predictive quality of the ratings
in 2012 versus the predictive quality of the ratings in 2013. Consistent with the regulatory
intervention that reduced the amount of greenwashing going from 2012 to 2013, higher en-
vironmental ratings no longer predicted more bad news going from 2012 to 2013. The news
predictability of social ratings improved in that higher social ratings predicted less bad news
in the future. 25
An assessment of book-to-market ratios supports a regime comprised of a large number of
SR investors by showing that the market does ascribe higher valuations to firms with higher
ratings. The association between ratings and market valuations appears to grow stronger
with more SRI demand only for environmental ratings. This is consistent with investors
focusing more on the environmental dimension of corporate social responsibility. The model
predicts that the market assigns increasingly higher share prices to higher-rated firms rela-
tive to lower-rated ones as the number of SR investors increase.
There are several conclusions to be drawn from the empirical analysis. The absence of
strong incremental predictive value of CSR ratings suggests these ratings do not appear to
offer valuable additional information to socially responsible investors. However, ratings mat-
24There is a small amount of overlap in the definitions underlying environmental and social ratings as
social ratings also include chemical safety in its underlying themes.
25As a side note, in the appendix, I show that ratings do not appear to properly capture historical corporate
behavior (penalties, lawsuits, and negative CSR-related media coverage). For instance, higher environmental
ratings reflect more lawsuits in the past year.
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ter for market valuations and suffer from greenwashing. These are exactly the conditions
described in the model of a world in which the ratings business serves a sizable number of
trusting investors who use ratings not for the value of information they contain but for the
value of institutional certification. In terms of policy recommendations, the quality of CSR
ratings can be improved when they are combined with regulation that restrict corporate
greenwashing.
Understanding the usefulness of CSR ratings is important for several major reasons.
First, most of the empirical research on corporate social responsibility and socially respon-
sible investing (SRI) have anchored their findings to ratings, which are widely accepted as
accurate descriptors of corporate social responsibility. As a result, numerous conflicting
and mixed results have emerged from efforts that attempt to make sense of the relationship
between corporate social responsibility and financial performance. Secondly, as one Wall
Street Journal commentator noted in September 2018, many socially conscious investors at
the same time have treated these ratings as ‘objective truths’. Are they right to place so
much faith in the ratings? It is an open question whether investors are buying ratings for
the value of information, or merely for the value of institutional certification.
The present paper relates to several strands of research. For one, I challenge the conven-
tional wisdom found in many papers studying the link between corporate social responsibility
and financial performance. I demonstrate that CSR ratings matter for prices even though
ratings appear to have little to do with CSR! This is explained by a model in which the rat-
ing agency caters to investors who use the ratings for the value of institutional certification.
Early notable works have considered corporate social responsibility as a dimension of mis-
pricing in that positive risk-adjusted returns can arise if intangibles like employee satisfaction
are underestimated by the market but improve future earnings (Derwall, Guenster, Bauer,
and Koedijk 2005; Statman and Glushkov 2009; Edmans 2011; Deng, Kang and Low 2013).
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On the other hand, corporate social responsibility could have a negative impact on firm value
if corporate social responsibility is a manifestation of managerial agency problems (Masulis
and Reza 2015; Krueger 2015; Benabou and Tirole 2010). Firm managers could, for instance,
obtain private benefits from embracing less productive green technologies or increasing em-
ployee pay at the expense of shareholder interests as a classic application of the managerial
perks issue studied in Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003).
Still, other authors like Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) maintain that investors should pay
a cost for discrimination (i.e. eschewing stocks from sin industries). Margolis, Elfenbein,
and Walsh (2011) conduct a meta-analysis of hundreds of papers and find no overarching
consensus on the performance of socially responsible investments either at the firm level or
at the fund level.26 Aside from a handful of exceptions (e.g. sin stocks, charitable giving,
event studies), most of the empirical evidence offered to support the aforementioned eco-
nomic channels behind financial performance rely on the ratings business being free from
informational distortions arising from poor incentives of the rating agency and the rated
firms.
Adding to the prior research on the motivations of investors and firm managers to become
involved with social responsibility, this paper shows that firm managers can have deceptive
motivations as they greenwash themselves to a higher rating. Existing works point to a
plethora of other characteristics that are shown to drive socially responsible corporate be-
havior. These include social norms (e.g. avoidance of sin products), political affiliations
(i.e. Democrats are more socially responsible than Republicans), daughters (i.e. CEOs with
daughters lean more towards social responsibility than those without), and legal origin (i.e.
firms from civil law countries tend to be more socially responsible than those from common
law countries) (Cronqvist and Yu 2017; Di Giuli and Kostovetsky 2014; Hong and Kacper-
czyk 2009; Hong and Kostovetsky 2012; Liang and Renneboog 2017).
26More recent papers on the subject have since emerged, such as Starks and Bialkowski (2016) who examine
the flows and performance of socially responsible mutual funds.
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The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 provides an overview of the CSR
ratings from the leading rating agency MSCI and the data on stakeholder outcomes. Sample
construction and the variables used are briefly explained. Section 2.3 presents the analysis
of the predictive quality of the environmental and social ratings. Section 2.4 offers causal
evidence of ratings manipulation by firms. Section 2.5 presents the market valuation analysis
of rated firms. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2. Data and Summary Statistics
In this section, I will describe the data used to analyze the informational content behind
CSR ratings and present their summary statistics. I will also outline briefly how the sample
is constructed from these multiple sets of data.
2.2.1. Ratings on Corporate Social Responsibility
The data source on CSR ratings is the most broadly used MSCI ratings (formerly known
as Intangible Value Assessment (IVA)) data set from MSCI, whose clients include 97 of the
top 100 global asset managers after MSCI in quick succession acquired KLD Research and
Analytics (creator of KLD STATS) in 2009 and then Innovest Strategic Value Advisors (cre-
ator of IVA) in late 2010 among others in this space and related areas (e.g. GMI, IRRC,
Riskmetrics, and ISS). Founded in the early 1990s, KLD Research and Analytics was the
first to score companies on their corporate environmental and social performance. However,
its legacy service, KLD STATS, once popular among practitioners a decade ago, was com-
mercially retired shortly after its acquisition by MSCI in favor of IVA, which does not rely
on subjective questionnaires. A team of around 200 IVA analysts approaches the task of
assessing a firm’s externalities on its stakeholders through information found in government
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and NGO databases, corporate disclosures, and thousands of media sources with particular
attention paid to issue categories, where applicable, listed in Table 2.1. This information is
then categorized according to the following main themes: climate change, natural resource
use, waste management, environmental opportunities, human capital, product safety, and
social opportunities. The first four themes form the basis for the overall firm environmental
score and the last three themes translate into the overall firm social score. These overall
scores range from 0 to 10. Firm coverage is based on the MSCI World Index.
The construction of CSR ratings by MSCI can involve discussion with companies for the
purpose of data verification and quality control and is ultimately reviewed by a committee
that votes on the new set of scores. Upon release, new scores are visible to clients via a
data feed. Here, I focus on U.S. firms from 2005 through 2016 as 2005 is the earliest date at
which overall firm environmental and social scores as issued annually became available. The
first three rows of Table 2.2 displays the summary statistics for the ratings, which average
around 5.
2.2.2. Regulatory Violations, Lawsuits, and Media Coverage
The novel and comprehensive source on regulatory violations comes from Good Jobs
First, a national policy resource center dedicated to promoting corporate and government
accountability. Its Violations Tracker dataset is the first to offer a uniquely comprehensive
aggregation of civil and criminal law enforcement action taken by U.S. federal regulatory
agencies as well as the U.S. Department of Justice since 2010 against both public and pri-
vate corporations. Appendix C shows that these enforcement actions span a broad range of
categories, from labor relations to environmental issues to bribery, as found in press releases
and administrative databases of the respective agencies. Violations with trivial penalties be-
low 5,000 dollars are excluded along with cases brought against individual executives unless
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the firm itself is also named. Penalty amounts are adjusted to avoid double-counting where
multiple agencies are involved. Table 2.2 presents the general statistics of the regulatory
violations according to the firms in the MSCI sample. I obtain lawsuit data at the firm level
as they appear in SEC disclosures pursuant to Regulation S-K from AuditAnalytics. The
news dimension of stakeholder relations is obtained from RepRisk, which tracks global me-
dia coverage of CSR-related incidents for firms. Founded in 2006, RepRisk serves numerous
institutional clients, from major hedge funds to large banks.
2.2.3. Sample Construction and Variables
Pricing and accounting information for U.S. firms publicly traded on the NYSE, NAS-
DAQ, and AMEX are obtained from CRSP and Compustat. To merge the data sets, I require
that the observations in IVA correspond to valid PERMNOs and gvkeys found in the pricing
and accounting records. I follow other studies by selecting stocks with CRSP share codes
of 10 or 11 and, for analysis involving book-to-market ratios, exclude firms with negative
book values and firms belonging to the finance and utility industries as these industries are
known to have accounting and regulatory practices that distort cash flows and valuation
ratios. To construct annual returns, I require that stocks have nonmissing monthly returns
over the course of the year. Firms with missing book values or ones less than 10 million
dollars are screened out. Similar to Fama and French (1992), a firm’s book-to-market ratio
(BM) in year t is its book equity, as of fiscal year t, over market equity 27, as of December
in year t. Profitability comes from Novy-Marx (2013), who divides revenues minus costs of
goods sold by total assets. Other common financial variables include capital expenditures
and cash, which are scaled by total assets, and investment, which is the annual percentage
growth in total assets, and leverage, which is debt over total assets, and dividends, which
are over earnings. Annual return variances are computed from daily returns with downside
27Following Bali, Engle, and Murray (2016), I use ‘price alternate’ [ALTPRC] in December of year t (i.e.
the last non-missing price of the month) to compute market equity (ME) in year t.
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variance being based off only negative return values. Size is the log of total assets. In the rare
occasions where CRSP delisting returns are unavailable for delisted firms, I follow Lochstoer
and Tetlock (2017) by assigning a delisting return of -90 percent.
Despite the availability of regulatory violations in one data source, putting them together
with the other pieces of data is an extremely labor-intensive process given how regulatory
violations are identified by company names found in the original documents from official
government sources. As a first pass, a customized multi-word matching algorithm, based on
the Levenshtein distance and Soundex, is used to produce a shortlist of candidates. Then
the shortlist for each firm is inspected by hand. Manual investigation of these matches is
necessary as different entities can sometimes have very similar names (e.g. Shaw Group
and Shaw Industries Group, or Alico and Alsco). Finally, the matching for lawsuits from
AuditAnalytics and RepRisk is much more straightforward as lawsuits and media coverage
are linked to the other data using their CIK codes and ISIN codes, respectively.
2.3. Predictive Quality of Environmental and Social Ratings
The aim of the section is to determine the meaningfulness of environmental and social
ratings in terms of their ability to predict important indicators of corporate behavior relevant
to stakeholders.28 To this end, I begin with a news-based measure of incidents related to
corporate social responsibility. I then consider regulatory violations and lawsuits as these are
strong indicators of corporate bad behavior that should be reduced when a firm is regarded
as socially responsible by the rating agency.
28Throughout my empirical analysis, I present my main findings with industry fixed effects because of
a limited amount of variation for each firm in the sample. My conclusions remain unchanged if I were to
replace industry fixed effects with firm fixed effects.
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2.3.1. Negative News Pertaining to Corporate Social Responsibility
Of the three indicators of stakeholder relations that I will discuss, a measure of incidents
related to social responsibility as reported in the media from across the world offers the
widest coverage. Examples of these incidents would be news stories on events like the BP
oil spill and Bangladesh factory collapse.
Table 2.3 presents the results of the stakeholder relations analysis for CSR-related inci-
dents as having appeared in the news worldwide. In particular, the negative news dependent
variable is the firm ‘reputational risk’, i.e. Reputational Risk Index (RRI) from RepRisk,
which ranges from 0 to 100 (with 100 being extremely troubled). The majority of firms
are below 25. The RRI at the end of every year takes into account of the following notable
features in a weighted scheme of news value: 1) the novelty of the incident (i.e. are the issues
mentioned new to the firm?); 2) the severity (i.e. how bad is the problem?); 3) the degree of
news source importance or influence (e.g. did the incident merit mainstream attention?).29
Surprisingly, environmental ratings significantly and positively predict bad news at the end
of the following year. The incremental effect is substantially diminished after controlling for
size and current RRI along with the other firm controls (i.e. profitability, book-to-market
ratio, investment, leverage, capex, cash, dividends, dual class, size, annual return, annual
29Novelty is either 1 or 2, with 1 being stale and 2 being the first time this issue (out of a set of envi-
ronmental and social issue categories) has appeared for a given firm. Severity is 1, 2, or 3, with 3 being
most severe. Severity is assessed in a rule-based way along three dimensions: (i) the consequences of the
risk incident (e.g. with respect to health and safety: no further consequences (1), injury (2), death(3)); (ii)
the extent of the risk incident (one person (1), a group of people (2), a large number of people (3)); (iii)
the risk incident caused by an accident (1), by negligence (2), or intent, or even in a systematic way (3).
Influence is 1, 2, or 3, with 3 being most influential based on readership and circulation. 1 corresponds to
low influence sources, such as local media, smaller NGOs, local gov. bodies, and blogs. 2 corresponds to
medium influence sources. They include most national and regional media, international NGOs, and state,
national, and international gov. bodies. High influence sources are the few international media e.g. the FT,
NY Times, BBC. The calculation of the RRI is as follows. For any given day there are two scenarios that
may happen: 1) if negative CSR-related news events appear, a recalculation is performed; 2) if there are no
negative CSR-related news: RRI decays. For the first 14 days after a negative CSR-related news event, the
RRI remains at its current value. If no new event occurs thereafter, the RRI decays at a rate of 25 every
2 months until it reaches 25. If the RRI is at or below 25 and no significant risk incidents are captured, it
decays to 0 after 18 months. In a set of untabulated regressions, I reach similar results qualitatively with
using the number of news events as dependent variables.
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variance, and annual downside variance).
Most of the reduction in the predictive content of the ratings results from controlling for
size. Appendix B shows that regressing environmental ratings on size and other firm char-
acteristics produces a strong positive link between firm size and its environmental rating.
Intuitively, large firms with high environmental ratings are also firms that receive more press
coverage. In terms of economic significance, the incremental predictive value of environmen-
tal ratings is quite small. A single standard deviation increase in the environmental rating
results in a half point (i.e. 0.263 times 2) increase in the negative CSR-related news index,
or less than a tenth of a standard deviation in the negative CSR-related news index.
For social ratings, the predictive ability of social ratings is not statistically significant
with or without firm controls in Table 2.4. The magnitudes and economic significance of
the coefficients here are similarly small, so the lack of statistical significance cannot be sim-
ply attributed to the number of observations. Although I choose to focus on analyzing
the predictive ability conditional on commonly observable firm characteristics like size and
industry, Appendix D shows that these conclusions are robust to alternative specifications
that consider changes in ratings and firm fixed effects. In the context of the model, these
results point to a world where socially conscious investors are using the ratings as a means
of institutional certification.
2.3.2. Regulatory Violations
To examine the informational quality of the ratings from a different dimension, Table 2.5
presents the estimates from regressing log regulatory penalties on the previous year’s envi-
ronmental rating without controlling for lagged firm characteristics. Across all four columns,
the first row makes it apparent that environmental ratings predict positively the amount of
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future penalties levied by regulators against corporations for either all violation categories
or just the environmental ones, which are defined in Appendix C.30 Higher social ratings
in Table 2.6 appear to predict less log total and social penalties in the future. Again, the
economic significance is weak. A one standard deviation increase in the social rating pre-
dicts less than one-tenth of a standard deviation decrease in penalties. Once controlling
for the other characteristics, namely size, the predictive effect of environmental ratings goes
away completely in Table 2.7 while the predictive effect of social ratings survives in Table
2.8. When firm fixed effects are included, as shown in Appendix D, both environmental and
social ratings provide essentially zero predictive value.
To summarize, while better environmental ratings predict more penalties in the future,
environmental ratings appear to have no incremental predictive value beyond firm size and
current penalty amount. Social ratings negatively predict future penalties until firm fixed
effects are included. The lack of predictive effect with controls (and the wrong direction of
predictive effect of environmental ratings without controls) along the environmental dimen-
sion calls into question the conventional practice of using ratings either to test economic
hypotheses pertaining to corporate social responsibility or to constrain financial investments
to high-rated firms with the goal of avoiding businesses that exhibit bad corporate behavior.
In terms of economic significance, without controlling for firm size, a one standard deviation
increase in environmental ratings increases total penalties by around 40 percent (i.e. 0.201
multiplied 2), or less than one-tenth of a standard deviation. Total penalties can be a better
measure of corporate behavior than penalties restricted to a few categories directly relevant
to the environment if the impact of corporate environmental misbehavior is felt in other
areas. For example, the release of harmful chemicals within a fifty-mile radius can adversely
affect the local town as well as creating a workplace safety issue.
30Bigger firms bear a greater share of regulatory scrutiny by virtue of the fact that their operations are
larger and they are more visible.
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2.3.3. Lawsuits
To check the robustness of the conclusions derived from the the negative media coverage
and regulatory penalties analysis, I perform a similar series of tests on lawsuits disclosed by
publicly traded firms to the SEC pursuant to Regulation S-K. Specifically, the regulation re-
quires the disclosure of ‘any material pending legal proceedings, other than ordinary routine
litigation incidental to the business’. The lawsuits therefore being analyzed are nontrivial.31
In doing so, I broaden the scope of harm studied to encompass those that do not fall under
the purview of the administrative state.
Table 2.9 reinforces Tables 2.3 and 2.5 by showing environmental ratings positively pre-
dict the number of lawsuits the following year. These results remain true after adjusting for
lawsuits in the current year. Without controlling for size, environmental ratings are not so
much as uninformative about future stakeholder outcomes as they are predictors of them,
but in the undesirable direction. A one standard deviation increase in environmental ratings
increases lawsuits by around one-third of a major environmental lawsuit, or over one stan-
dard deviation for environmental lawsuits. The economic magnitudes from these predictive
effects are not as small as they might appear since the SEC require these lawsuits to be
major ones, which in the data are relatively uncommon as around at least half the public
firms covered in a given year can escape unscathed. In this case with lawsuits, social ratings
appear to offer no predictive value at all even without controls in Table 2.10 or with controls
in Table 2.12. Once again, for environmental ratings, the incremental predictive effect, after
controlling for size (and other firm characteristics), in Table 2.11 is zero.32
31Environmental lawsuits are defined as lawsuits with associated with at least one of the following labels:
agriculture law, energy law, environmental law, natural resources law. Social lawsuits are defined as law-
suits with associated with at least one of the following labels with their category numbers in parentheses:
Americans with Disabilities (69, 72), Civil Rights (14, 80, 64), Disability Law (15), Employment Law (18),
ERISA (49), Fair Housing (67), Fair Labor (63), Free Speech (22), Health (24), Labor Law (30), Libel (32),
Injury to Persons (57, 75, 70, 74, 81, 78,), Product Liability (76, 68, 36).
32To detect potential nonlinearities in the relationship between ratings and outcomes, Appendix G breaks
the continuous ratings into bins to show that inferences made in the above analysis is robust. This is
consistent with the fact that there are no well-defined investment criteria thresholds for these ratings.
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2.4. Evidence on Ratings Manipulation by Firms
The empirical analysis above shows that the informational quality of environmental and
social ratings is very poor in terms of their predictive value to investors who observe com-
monly known financial characteristics like firm size. The model suggests that firm managers
may have an incentive to distort the informational value of ratings. I test this implication
of the model by making use of a natural experiment.
2.4.1. A Natural Experiment
Some businesses are inherently dirty while others are cleaner and less harmful to their
stakeholders. To improve its public image and foster a reputation for being socially respon-
sible, a firm can engage in various forms of misleading public relations messaging collectively
known as greenwashing. A standard example of greenwashing would be a firm claiming its
food products are harvested in an eco-friendly manner when in fact its practices damage the
ecosystem of animals and indigenous people. Therefore, without having to fundamentally
alter its methods of production, a firm can change how others perceive it. For the rating
agency, its amassed information set on firms, therefore, may be tainted with untruths that
undermine the informational value of the ratings.
Given the deceptive nature of greenwashing, direct observation of it is challenging. More-
over, the amount of greenwashing generated is typically at the firm’s discretion. To properly
investigate the influence greenwashing is likely to have had on environmental ratings, I make
use of a plausible source of exogenous variation in greenwashing from a regulatory inter-
vention. Specifically, around the end of 2012, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), whose
mandate is to protect American consumers, issued a new ruling directed at clamping down
on misleading or wholly false claims related to environmental attributes as marketed to con-
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sumers.33 Not all firms were equally affected. The ones in the business-to-consumer (B2C)
industries bore the brunt of the new regulatory scrutiny. In the context of the model, the
regulatory intervention can be interpreted as a shock to the cost of deceptive public relations
by the manager of the bad type firm. Since its inception, a slew of enforcement actions have
taken place against B2C firms ranging from household names like Nordstrom to smaller en-
tities like Ecobaby Organics, which sells mattresses.
Table 2.13 presents the difference-in-difference estimation results that assess the impact
of the FTC regulatory action on environmental ratings. Columns 1 and 2 indicate B2C firms
experienced a nearly one environmental ratings point drop going from 2012 to 2013 relative
to firms that do not belong to B2C industries. The change is nontrivial as the ratings average
around 5 on a 10-point scale.34 For social ratings, Table 2.14 shows that they too experi-
enced a slightly smaller decrease of around half a point on a ten-point scale. There is some
overlap between environmental and social ratings in that social ratings are defined in Table
2.1 to account for product liability and chemical safety. Furthermore, there is a tendency for
characteristics like locally grown, environmentally friendly, treating people right to appear
together among claims marketed to consumers.
B2C classification follows the methodology found in Delgado and Mills (2017) who intro-
duce a new categorization approach using the percentage of industry value sold to personal
consumption expenditure (PCE) based on input-output accounts. A higher percentage in-
dicates that the business is more consumer-oriented. I define B2C as above 75 percent and
33There are some limitations to the FTC crackdown that are worth noting. For one, claims about the
‘organic’ characteristic are already regulated by the U.S. Department of Agricultures (USDA) National
Organic Program and hence fall outside the FTC’s jurisdiction. An inspection of government records on
the USDA National Organic Program show no shifts in their policies over the time period studied. Second,
‘natural’ and ‘sustainable’ are descriptions in which FTC has expressed a reluctance to comment on due to
the ambiguousness of these two words.
34Appendix I shows that these results are not strongly affected by and therefore are robust to firm fixed
effects.
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non-B2C as below 25 percent).35 In an unreported set of regressions, I check that the effect
is only taking place from 2012 to 2013 (as opposed to when there was no regulatory inter-
vention, for instance, from 2013 to 2014, 2014 to 2015, or 2011 to 2012).
2.4.2. Robustness
To the extent that the FTC was effective in stamping out greenwashing by firms of the
bad type, there should be some evidence of an improvement in the predictive quality of
environmental ratings (i.e. if the effect is positive from firm manipulation, then it should
be less positive or even negative; if the effect is already negative, then it should be more
negative).
Table 2.15 shows that indeed, from going from 2012 to 2013, the average predictive effect
of environmental ratings on negative CSR-related news for all firms was reduced by around
0.1 and became statistically insignificant. If the sample is restricted to the B2C firms, the
reduction is even stronger (i.e. around a 0.68 drop, going from 0.623 to -0.060) compared
to both the average sample and the non-B2C firms. The predictive ability of non-B2C firms
hovers around zero in both 2012 and 2013. Note that the sum of the observations in B2C
and non-B2C do not add up the total number of observations in a given year because B2C
and non-B2C exclude firms associated with intermediate PCE values.
For social ratings, Table 2.16 reports a similar pattern going from 2012 to 2013. For all
firms, the average effect improved weakly by less than 0.1. For B2C firms, the change was
stronger (i.e. around -0.4) but still much less than the sharp 0.68 decline found in environ-
mental rating predictive estimate. Non-B2C firms exhibited a negligible move towards zero.
35I check that other thresholds, such as 70 and 30, produce similar results.
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2.5. The Market Valuation of Firms
Another implication of the model suggests that, in World 2 (or World 1), ratings should
generate a higher market valuation for firms with higher ratings relative to the ones with
lower ratings. That is, regardless of whether SR investors are primarily sophisticated or
trusting, a sufficiently strong demand from SR investors who use ratings should push apart
market prices for firms with different ratings. Table 2.17 displays the key coefficient esti-
mates from regressing the log book-to-market ratio on environmental and social ratings. The
baseline regression without firm controls in Column 1 shows that a one standard deviation
increase in environmental ratings decreases the book-to-market (BM) ratio by around 7 per-
cent (i.e. 2 times -0.036) and is highly statistically significant. The effect is robust to the
inclusion of firm controls in Column 2.
Given the large growth in socially responsible investing over the period covered in my
sample, it is plausible that the association between ratings and valuation ratios vary with
demand from SR investors. Using data from the Investment Company Institute and the
U.S. Forum for Responsible and Sustainable Investment, I construct an annual time series
of the proportion of assets managed by U.S.-registered investment companies with a social
responsibility mandate called PropSR. From less than 2 percent in 2005, it has grown to 14
percent in 2016. 36
Column 3 in Table 2.17 indicates that indeed, as socially responsible investing has grown
more popular, the strength of the link between market valuations and environmental ratings
36The numbers from the Investment Company Institute are on an annual basis while the numbers from
the U.S. Forum for Responsible and Sustainable Investment are recorded biennially with the exception of
2008-2009. For years not covered, I take the average of the year before and the year after as a proxy for
the assets managed with a socially responsible mandate in that year. For 2008 and 2009, I used values from
2007 because averaging between 2007 and 2010 would result in SRI assets growing during the financial crisis.
It’s worth noting that I obtain similar regression results if I use the combined assets under management
for mutual funds, variable annuity funds, exchange-traded funds (ETFs) and closed-end funds instead of
the numbers found in the main figure (i.e. Figure B) in the 2016 report) describing socially responsible
investment funds.
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became more pronounced. The interaction term indicates that, for a ten percent increase in
PropSR, a one standard deviation in environmental ratings has an additional negative effect
of 7 percent on the BM ratio. Using the latest value of 14 percent for PropSR in 2016, this
implies about a 10 percent decrease in the BM ratio for a one standard deviation increase
in the environmental ratings.
For social ratings, Column 4 in Table 2.17 show that the investor interest lies more with
the environmental attributes. A one standard deviation increase in social ratings is associ-
ated with a 3 to 4 percent decrease in the BM ratio. Including other terms in Columns 5
and 6 does not materially change this statistically significant effect. Unlike environmental
ratings, the association between social ratings and market valuations do not appear to have
changed with the rise of socially responsible investing. In this section, I again have presented
the main results with industry fixed effects due to a limited amount of variation for each
firm in the sample. In a set of unreported regressions, I show that results are the same
qualitatively when industry fixed effects are replaced with firm fixed effects.
In summary, the model and the empirical evidence point to a world where the rating
agency is paid by investors, not mainly for the informative signal it provides in the form of
ratings, but for the value of institutional certification. Firm managers are in turn motivated
to engage in public relations that enhance their likelihood of obtaining a high rating as the
market places a higher value on firms with a higher rating.
2.6. Conclusion
Using a set of the most broadly used commercial ratings, I uncover evidence of manipula-
tion when environmental and social ratings declined in response to a regulatory intervention
that imposed a plausibly exogenous increase in the cost of greenwashing for business-to-
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consumer (B2C) firms relative to non-B2C firms in a difference-in-difference identification
setting. In terms of ratings quality, I discover better environmental ratings predict worse
future corporate behavior based on a novel set of benchmarks (i.e. regulatory penalties,
major lawsuits, and negative CSR-related news) while lacking incremental predictive value
beyond a set of commonly observed firm characteristics, notably firm size. Social ratings
appear to offer weak predictive value overall. An examination of valuation ratios indicates
that higher-rated firms do receive higher market values. Taken together, the empirical re-
sults point to a regime where the CSR rating agency is providing a form of institutional
certification for a sizable group of trusting socially conscious investors.
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Table 2.1 Hierarchy of Corporate Social Responsibility Considerations. This ta-
ble shows the inputs that underlie the components of corporate social responsibility (i.e.
environmental and social) from MSCI. For issues, * indicates that the issue is assessed for
all companies covered by MSCI. Source: MSCI.
CSR Information Hierarchy
Main Components Themes Issues




Natural Resources Water Stress*
Raw Material Sourcing
Biodiversity and Land Use
Pollution and Waste Toxic Emissions and Waste*
Electronic Waste
Packaging Material and Waste
Environmental Opportunities Opportunities in Clean Tech
Opportunities in Renewable Energy
Opportunities in Green Building
Social Human Capital Labor Management*
Human Capital Development
Health and Safety*
Supply Chain Labor Standards
Product Liability Product Safety and Quality




Health and Demographic Risk
Stakeholder Opposition Controversial Sourcing
Social Opportunities Access to Communications
Access to Health Care
Access to Finance
Opportunities in Nutrition and Health
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Table 2.2 Summary Statistics of CSR Ratings and Corporate Bad Behavior Benchmarks (MSCI Sample).
Observations Mean Std. Dev. Start Year End Year
Environmental Rating 10,188 4.615 1.964 2005 2016
Social Rating 10,188 4.433 1.633 2005 2016
Regulatory Penalties (in log dollars) 6,481 2.961 5.161 2010 2016
Environmental Regulatory Penalties (in log dollars) 6,481 0.950 3.231 2010 2016
Social Regulatory Penalties (in log dollars) 6,481 2.172 4.373 2010 2016
Number of Major Lawsuits 8262 0.717 1.750 2006 2016
Number of Major Environmental Lawsuits 8262 0.024 0.174 2006 2016
Number of Major Social Lawsuits 8262 0.102 0.442 2006 2016
RRI (i.e. social responsibility-related news incident index) 4621 11.010 13.731 2007 2015
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Table 2.3 Environmental Ratings and Negative CSR-related News. This table
reports the estimation results of regressions where the dependent variable is the Reputational
Risk Index (RRI), a news-based measure of incidents related to corporate social responsibility
(i.e. December of the following year). Standard errors, clustered by three-digit SIC codes,
are reported in parentheses. Significance at the ten percent level is given by *; at the five
percent level **, at the one percent level ***.
(1) (2)
Negative CSR-related Negative CSR-related
Newsi,t Newsi,t
Environmental Ratingi,t−1 0.849*** 0.263**
(0.088) (0.072)
Negative CSR-related Newsi,t−1 0.659*** 0.416***
(0.028) (0.030)
Controls? No Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes
Industry FE? Yes Yes
Observations 4326 4326
Adj. R2 0.622 0.688
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Table 2.4 Social Ratings and Negative CSR-related News. This table reports the
estimation results of regressions where the dependent variable is the Reputational Risk Index
(RRI), a news-based measure of incidents related to corporate social responsibility at the
end of the following year. Standard errors, clustered by three-digit SIC codes, are reported
in parentheses. Significance at the ten percent level is given by *; at the five percent level
**, at the one percent level ***.
(1) (2)
Negative CSR-related Negative CSR-related
Newsi,t Newsi,t
Social Ratingi,t−1 -0.171 -0.124
(0.142) (0.094)
Negative CSR-related Newsi,t−1 0.690*** 0.419***
(0.027) (0.030)
Controls? No Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes
Industry FE? Yes Yes
Observations 4326 4326
Adj. R2 0.617 0.689
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Table 2.5 Environmental Ratings and Regulatory Violations (without firm char-
acteristics). This table reports the estimation results of regressions where the dependent
variables are 1) log values of total penalties assessed through regulatory action in the U.S.
and 2) log values of environmental penalties. Explanatory variables are lagged by one year.
Standard errors, clustered by three-digit SIC codes, are reported in parentheses. Significance
at the ten percent level is given by *; at the five percent level **, at the one percent level
***.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Total Environmental Environmental
Penaltiesi,t Penaltiesi,t Penaltiesi,t Penaltiesi,t
Environmental Ratingi,t−1 0.314*** 0.201*** 0.131*** 0.097***





Controls? No No No No
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6481 6481 6481 6481
Adj. R2 0.247 0.320 0.202 0.238
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Table 2.6 Social Ratings and Regulatory Violations (without firm characteris-
tics). This table reports the estimation results of regressions where the dependent variables
are 1) log values of total penalties assessed through regulatory action in the U.S. and 2)
log values of social penalties. Explanatory variables are lagged by one year. Standard er-
rors, clustered by three-digit SIC codes, are reported in parentheses. Significance at the ten
percent level is given by *; at the five percent level **, at the one percent level ***.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tot. Penaltiesi,t Tot. Penaltiesi,t Soc. Penaltiesi,t Soc. Penaltiesi,t
Soc. Ratingi,t−1 -0.161*** -0.109** -0.138*** -0.105***





Controls? No No No No
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6481 6481 6481 6481
Adj. R2 0.240 0.318 0.224 0.280
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Table 2.7 Environmental Ratings and Regulatory Violations (with firm charac-
teristics). This table reports the estimation results of regressions where the dependent
variables are 1) log values of total penalties assessed through regulatory action in the U.S.
and 2) log values of environmental penalties. Explanatory variables are lagged by one year.
Standard errors, clustered by three-digit SIC codes, are reported in parentheses. Significance
at the ten percent level is given by *; at the five percent level **, at the one percent level
***.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Total Environmental Environmental
Penaltiesi,t Penaltiesi,t Penaltiesi,t Penaltiesi,t
Environmental Ratingi,t−1 -0.013 -0.001 0.021 0.016





Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6481 6481 6481 6481
Adj. R2 0.319 0.357 0.226 0.252
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Table 2.8 Social Ratings and Regulatory Violations (with firm characteristics).
This table reports the estimation results of regressions where the dependent variables are 1)
log values of total penalties assessed through regulatory action in the U.S. and 2) log values
of social penalties. Explanatory variables are lagged by one year. Standard errors, clustered
by three-digit SIC codes, are reported in parentheses. Significance at the ten percent level
is given by *; at the five percent level **, at the one percent level ***.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tot. Penaltiesi,t Tot. Penaltiesi,t Soc. Penaltiesi,t Soc. Penaltiesi,t
Soc. Ratingi,t−1 -0.088** -0.067* -0.085** -0.072**





Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6481 6481 6481 6481
Adj. R2 0.320 0.358 0.278 0.310
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Table 2.9 Environmental Ratings and Litigation (without firm characteristics).
This table reports the estimation results of regressions where the dependent variables are
the number of lawsuits in the following year. Standard errors, clustered by three-digit SIC
codes, are reported in parentheses. No firm characteristics from previously are included as
controls. Significance at the ten percent level is given by *; at the five percent level **,
at the one percent level ***. For these negative binomial models, the adjusted McFadden
R-squared is reported.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Total Environmental Environmental
Lawsuitsi,t Lawsuitsi,t Lawsuitsi,t Lawsuitsi,t
Environmental Ratingi,t−1 0.134*** 0.078*** 0.166*** 0.161***





Controls? No No No No
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8262 8262 8262 8262
Adj. R2 0.291 0.360 0.081 0.083
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Table 2.10 Social Ratings and Litigation (without firm characteristics). This table
reports the estimation results of regressions where the dependent variables are the number
of lawsuits in the following year. Standard errors, clustered by three-digit SIC codes, are
reported in parentheses. No firm characteristics from previously are included as controls.
Significance at the ten percent level is given by *; at the five percent level **, at the one
percent level ***. For these negative binomial models, the adjusted McFadden R-squared is
reported.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tot. Lawsuitsi,t Tot. Lawsuitsi,t Soc. Lawsuitsi,t Soc. Lawsuitsi,t
Soc. Ratingsi,t−1 -0.004 -0.014 0.038 0.037





Controls? No No No No
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8262 8262 8262 8262
Adj. R2 0.273 0.354 0.168 0.173
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Table 2.11 Environmental Ratings and Litigation (with firm characteristics).
This table reports the estimation results of regressions where the dependent variables are
the number of lawsuits in the following year. Standard errors, clustered by three-digit SIC
codes, are reported in parentheses. Significance at the ten percent level is given by *; at the
five percent level **, at the one percent level ***. For these negative binomial models, the
adjusted McFadden R-squared is reported.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Total Environmental Environmental
Lawsuitsi,t Lawsuitsi,t Lawsuitsi,t Lawsuitsi,t
Environmental Ratingi,t−1 0.015 0.003 0.010 0.011





Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8262 8262 8262 8262
Adj. R2 0.382 0.406 0.116 0.119
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Table 2.12 Social Ratings and Litigation (with firm characteristics). This table
reports the estimation results of regressions where the dependent variables are the number
of lawsuits in the following year. Standard errors, clustered by three-digit SIC codes, are
reported in parentheses. Significance at the ten percent level is given by *; at the five
percent level **, at the one percent level ***. For these negative binomial models, the
adjusted McFadden R-squared is reported.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tot. Lawsuitsi,t Tot. Lawsuitsi,t Soc. Lawsuitsi,t Soc. Lawsuitsi,t
Soc. Ratingi,t−1 -0.015 -0.020 0.033 0.032





Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8262 8262 8262 8262
Adj. R2 0.382 0.407 0.250 0.255
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Table 2.13 The Impact on Environmental Ratings from a Government Clamp-
down on Greenwashing. This table reports the estimation results of regressions where
the dependent variable are environmental ratings from 2012 to 2013. Around the end of
2012, the Federal Trade Commission enacted a ruling that was aimed at curtailing unfair
or deceptive claims by businesses related to sustainability and the environment. The policy
targeted marketing information as conveyed to consumers. Standard errors clustered by in-
dustry are reported in parentheses. B2C is equal to 1 if firm i belongs to the treated group,
i.e. business-to-consumer industry j. Significance at the ten percent level is given by *; at
the five percent level **, at the one percent level ***.
(1) (2)
Environmental Ratingi,t Environmental Ratingi,t
B2Cj x PostPeriodt -0.793*** -0.729***
(0.218) (0.210)
Controls? No Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes
Industry FE? Yes Yes
Observations 1875 1875
Adj. R2 0.511 0.559
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Table 2.14 The Impact on Social Ratings from a Government Clampdown on
Greenwashing. This table reports the estimation results of regressions where the dependent
variable are social ratings from 2012 to 2013. Around the end of 2012, the Federal Trade
Commission enacted a ruling that was aimed at curtailing unfair or deceptive claims by
businesses related to sustainability and the environment. The policy targeted marketing
information as conveyed to consumers. Standard errors clustered by industry are reported
in parentheses. B2C is equal to 1 if firm i belongs to the treated group, i.e. business-to-
consumer industry j. Significance at the ten percent level is given by *; at the five percent
level **, at the one percent level ***.
(1) (2)
Social Ratingi,t Social Ratingi,t
B2Cj x PostPeriodt -0.470** -0.469**
(0.187) (0.185)
Controls? No Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes
Industry FE? Yes Yes
Observations 1875 1875
Adj. R2 0.218 0.226
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Table 2.15 Environmental Ratings (2012 versus 2013) and Negative CSR-related News. This table reports the
estimation results of regressions where the dependent variable is the Reputational Risk Index (RRI), a news-based measure
of incidents related to corporate social responsibility (CSR) (i.e. end of the following year). Standard errors, clustered by
three-digit SIC codes, are reported in parentheses. Significance at the ten percent level is given by *; at the five percent level
**, at the one percent level ***.
2012 2013
All B2C Non-B2C All B2C Non-B2C
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Neg. Newsi,t Neg. Newsi,t Neg. Newsi,t Neg. Newsi,t Neg. Newsi,t Neg. Newsi,t
Env. Ratingi,t−1 0.426*** 0.623 0.104 0.339* -0.060 0.069
(0.155) (0.757) (0.183) (0.194) (0.753) (0.191)
Neg. Newsi,t−1 0.474*** 0.640*** 0.496*** 0.569*** 0.554*** 0.514***
(0.044) (0.118) (0.069) (0.045) (0.147) (0.070)
Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1059 128 657 1147 147 715
Adj. R2 0.723 0.755 0.712 0.705 0.784 0.691
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Table 2.16 Social Ratings (2012 versus 2013) and Negative CSR-related News. This table reports the estimation
results of regressions where the dependent variable is the Reputational Risk Index (RRI), a news-based measure of incidents
related to corporate social responsibility (CSR) (i.e. end of the following year). Standard errors, clustered by three-digit SIC
codes, are reported in parentheses. Significance at the ten percent level is given by *; at the five percent level **, at the one
percent level ***.
2012 2013
All B2C Non-B2C All B2C Non-B2C
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Neg. Newsi,t Neg. Newsi,t Neg. Newsi,t Neg. Newsi,t Neg. Newsi,t Neg. Newsi,t
Soc. Ratingi,t−1 -0.131 0.209 -0.139 -0.243 -0.237 0.059
(0.128) (0.888) (0.144) (0.201) (0.916) (0.193)
Neg. Newsi,t−1 0.478*** 0.644*** 0.497*** 0.571*** 0.555*** 0.514***
(0.043) (0.117) (0.069) (0.044) (0.149) (0.070)
Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1059 128 657 1147 147 715
Adj. R2 0.720 0.753 0.692 0.705 0.724 0.689
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Table 2.17 Valuation Ratio Analysis. This table reports the estimation results of regressions where the dependent variable
is the log book-to-market (BM) ratio. PropSRt is the estimated annual proportion of assets under management for U.S.-
registered investment companies with a social responsibility mandate. Standard errors, clustered by three-digit SIC codes, are
reported in parentheses. Significance at the ten percent level is given by *; at the five percent level **, at the one percent level
***.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log BM Ratioi,t log BM Ratioi,t log BM Ratioi,t log BM Ratioi,t log BM Ratioi,t log BM Ratioi,t
Env. Ratingi,t -0.036*** -0.035*** 0.001
(0.008) (0.006) (0.009)
Env.i,t x PropSRt -0.358**
(0.097)
Social Ratingi,t -0.021** -0.017** -0.028**
(0.011) (0.008) (0.013)
Soc.i,t x PropSRt 0.119
(0.110)
Controls? No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9728 9571 9571 9728 9571 9571
Adj. R2 0.159 0.408 0.409 0.155 0.405 0.405
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3. Socially Irresponsible Corporate Behavior
3.1. Introduction
Recent years have seen environmental and social concerns emerge as an important con-
sideration in the choice of portfolios. For a growingly large body of investors, the goal is
to not only earn a financial payoff but to do so in a socially responsible manner (Riedl and
Smeets 2017). In the U.S. alone, around one in four dollars were professionally managed
with a socially responsible mandate as of 2018 (US Forum for Responsible and Sustainable
Investment 2018).
With such a mandate arises a new challenge: how should investors go about deciding
who is socially responsible and who is not? In the public markets, many institutions address
this challenge through the use of commercial ratings about corporate social responsibility
(CSR) as sold by MSCI. With over a thousand institutional clients, including most of the
top 100 asset managers around the world, MSCI has been the industry leader in this space.37
Despite its widespread adoption within the establishment, the leading commercial CSR
ratings are not without serious flaws. As the first two chapters show, these ratings are vul-
nerable to informational manipulation by the rated firms. In a stark paradox, better environ-
mental ratings are shown to predict more corporate bad behavior in the future. Moreover,
very little is known about the ratings themselves as a great deal of opaqueness exists about
how the ratings are generated.
As these issues draw more attention from the investing public, it is not clear what can
37While MSCI has enjoyed a free reign in this area for the most part of its history, MSCI’s business of
providing commercial environmental and social ratings is no longer without competition from potentially
serious contenders like Thomson Reuters for instance.
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be done about addressing them.38 One promising route, as studied in Chapter 2, is the
regulatory approach as CSR ratings inflation is shown to be reduced and quality is shown
to be improved when combined with proper regulations (Yang 2018). Alternatively, new
competition to MSCI could offer more meaningful signals to investors.
In this paper, I focus on the latter by first investigating the ratings from a new entrant,
Thomson Reuters, as predictive signals for investors with respect to future corporate bad
behavior. The prediction from theory about the quality of these ratings is ambiguous as the
rating agencies can either be competing on informational quality or on licensing fees. For
example, a new entrant could seek as its intended audience a group of sophisticated socially
conscious investors and generate ratings that are informative about future corporate behav-
ior. On the other hand, a new entrant could target trusting investors who accept ratings at
face value and attempt to draw clients by undercutting MSCI on fees. Hence, this empiri-
cal investigation into the predictive value of ratings also sheds some insight on the type of
clientele involved with socially responsible investing.
Using the three benchmarks on corporate bad behavior from Chapter 2, I find better
environmental and social ratings from Thomson Reuters do indeed predict more regulatory
penalties, lawsuits, and negative news related to CSR in the following year. Upon controlling
for size, the incremental predictive value substantially deteriorates. In this respect, these
ratings are similar to those of MSCI, which offers weak incremental predictive value beyond
firm size and other commonly observed firm characteristics.39
In light of the unsatisfactory performance of the leading commercial ratings, I introduce
a new set of environmental and social ratings, the Corporate Badness (CB) ratings. These
38www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-18/exxon-great-marlboros-awesome-how-esg-investing-lost-
its-way
39The correlations between MSCI and Thomson Reuters ratings are around 30 percent.
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ratings differentiate from the commercial ones across several dimensions.
First, as I will discuss in more detail below, the methodology behind the construction of
the CB ratings is transparent. The information set underlying the CB ratings come from
a parsimonious choice of inputs on corporate bad behavior found in administrative records
and news articles. The optimal weighting scheme is generated by choosing weights such that
they maximize the predictive ability of the CB ratings with respect to future corporate bad
behavior. The commercial ratings, by comparison, are extremely opaque as very little is
known about their contents apart from some broad thematic highlights and general infor-
mation about sources. Their selection of weights on inputs arrives from essentially a black
box with virtually no justification.
Second, the CB ratings offer predictive value about future corporate bad behavior out-of-
sample. Worse CB ratings on average correctly forecast more penalties, more major lawsuits,
and more negative news related to CSR in the future. The implications of this result are
threefold. For one, the CB ratings demonstrate that the task of creating meaningful ratings
that contain useful predictive value for future corporate bad behavior is not an exercise in
futility. While far from perfect, the CB ratings provide a starting point for additional refine-
ments that may incorporate new streams of information and offer a baseline from which other
ratings can be evaluated against. In the context of the MSCI ratings from Chapter 2, I show
that the disagreement between MSCI and CB serves as a effective tool for addressing the
challenge of quantifying greenwashing. By controlling for disagreement, I show that better
MSCI ratings now predict less corporate bad behavior in the future. In essence, this allows
for me to disentangle the effect of manipulation from the useful part of the MSCI ratings.
Finally, the CB ratings by themselves can help socially conscious investors correctly identify
and avoid companies that are likely to pose environmental and social problems in the future.
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In terms of its connection to the prior literature, this paper is a sequel to the work above,
which is the first to study how the CSR ratings market operates. It adopts the benchmarks
found in Chapter 2 for corporate bad behavior.
This paper is similar in spirit to several earlier seminal works that introduce measures for
certain characteristics of interest in other areas of finance. These include credit risk, finan-
cial constraints, corporate governance, and investor sentiment (Altman 1968; Kaplan and
Zingales 1997; Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 2003; Baker and Wurgler 2006). Aside from the
difference in subject area, the methodology used here to construct the CB ratings requires
minimal human input, as opposed to previous approaches that tend to involve a substantial
amount of human decisionmaking. More importantly, the CB ratings are validated through
their predictive ability out-of-sample.
This paper also shares some commonalities with other noted academic studies that assess
important financial models used in practice based on their forecasting performance. Meese
and Rogoff (1983) show that the popular structural and time series models of their time
for exchange rates performed no better than the random walk out-of-sample. A more re-
cent work is the study by Daines, Gow and Larcker (2010), who find that the widely used
commercial models of corporate governance suffer from serious deficiencies and provide no
guidance for companies and their shareholders beyond noise.
Finally, this chapter also relates to the literature that studies the relationship between
corporate social responsibility and financial performance. For example, Edmans (2011) finds
that employee satisfaction contributes positively to future earnings and returns. This is in
line with many other papers that espouse the view of CSR being intangible features not fully
valued by the market but enhances cash flows of the firm later on (Statman and Glushkov
2009; Deng, Kang, and Low 2013; Dimson, Karakas, and Li 2015). More recently, Hoepner,
67
Oikonomou, Sautner, Starks, Zhou (2016) provide evidence suggesting that engaging in CSR
can reduce downside risk for firms. In contrast, Masulis and Reza (2015) contend that being
socially responsible involves wasteful expenditures that arises from agency problems with the
firm manager and is hurtful to firm value. A large part of these empirical studies relies on
ratings as their primary source of information on CSR. Among them, there is no consensus
with regards to CSR and financial performance. I contribute to this body of research by
showing that corporate socially irresponsible behavior, while important in its own right to
socially conscious investors, play a negligible role in terms of predicting future operating
performance, firm value, and downside risk.
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the ratings from Thom-
son Reuters and the data on corporate bad behavior. Section 3.3 describes the methodology
used to construct the Corporate Badness (CB) environmental and social ratings. Section 3.4
assesses the predictive value of the ratings. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2. Data and Summary Statistics
In this section, I will first introduce the ratings from Thomson Reuters and present their
summary statistics. I will then describe the inputs that enter into the Corporate Badness
(CB) ratings as well as the information about the pricing and accounting variables.
3.2.1. Environmental and Social Ratings From Thomson Reuters
The commercial ratings on CSR studied in this chapter come from Thomson Reuters
(formerly known as Asset4 ratings), which has recently emerged as a competitor to MSCI,
the dominant ratings provider. In an approach extremely similar to the one described by
MSCI, Thomson Reuters considers a variety of unstructured data sources for its ratings,
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which include but are not limited to annual investor reports, CSR reports, the websites of
the rated companies, NGOs.
From these sources, a process is then applied to arrive at over 400 possible data points for
each firm. Around one hundred analysts participate in this process, which reportedly involves
verification and quality control. These data points are organized into several thematic cat-
egories that define environmental and social ratings: resource use, emissions, environmental
innovation, workforce, human rights, community, product responsibility. The environmen-
tal and social ratings range from 0 to 100, with 0 being the worst and 100 being the best.
Table 3.1 displays the summary statistics for these ratings, which have a mean of about 50.
For U.S. companies, the firms that are covered come from the MSCI World Index, SP 500,
NASDAQ 100, and the Russell 1000.
3.2.2. Corporate Bad Behavior
The information on corporate bad behavior are collected from several sources: regula-
tory violations, lawsuits, and the news. Regulatory violations are those found in Good Jobs
First, which has a Violations Tracker dataset that provides a comprehensive record of the
regulatory penalties attributed to the 40-plus federal regulatory agencies in the U.S. The
data itself is assembled from the administrative records and official press releases of these
regulatory bodies. The penalties encompass 59 categories that range from environmental
violations to labor relations violations to product safety violations. A detailed description
of these categories can be found in the previous chapter. Lawsuit information come from
SEC disclosures as required by Regulation S-K. Data about negative news related to CSR
is obtained through RepRisk, which analyzes news articles worldwide about corporations by
taking into account important qualities like staleness, severity, and influence (or readership).
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3.2.3. Pricing and Accounting Information
The other variables in this study are the firms controls, as used in Chapter 2, constructed
from the information about financial characteristics found in CRSP and Compustat. Invest-
ment is the annual percentage growth in total assets. Firm size is the log of total assets.
Leverage is debt over total assets. Profitability is revenues minus cost of goods sold scaled
by total assets. Book-to-market ratio in year t is its book equity in fiscal year t divided
by its market equity in December of year t. Capital expenditures and cash are also scaled
by total assets. Annual return variances are calculated from daily returns with at least 200
observations. Downside variance is constructed from the negative values for daily returns.
In addition to these control variables, I also consider operating performance, which is in-
come from operations divided by total assets, and firm value, measured through Tobin’s Q,
i.e. (total assets + market value of equity - book value of equity)/total assets, as financial
outcomes of interest. I require that stocks have nonmissing monthly returns when forming
annual returns. I exclude firms with negative or missing book-to-market ratios and firms
that are in the financial services and utilities. I also screen out firms with book values of
less than 10 million. Stocks have share codes of either 10 or 11.
3.3. Corporate Badness Ratings
Prior work in the previous chapter provides several benchmarks (i.e. regulatory penal-
ties, lawsuits, and news) for socially irresponsible behavior by corporations. These have been
used to help reveal several shortcomings with the leading commercial environmental and so-
cial ratings. Notably, the failure of the leading commercial ratings to serve as meaningful
signals to socially conscious investors about future corporate bad behavior. For the purpose
of this chapter, these benchmarks can also serve as critical inputs for the construction of a
new type of environmental and social ratings. That is, designing environmental and social
ratings to help investors effectively identify and guide them away from firms that are likely
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to be ‘dirty’ in the future. The goal of creating ratings that offer meaningful predictive value
about corporate bad behavior echoes the sentiment from practitioners who have expressed
an interest in environmental (social) ratings that inform them about environmental (social)
defaults just as credit ratings inform them about credit defaults.40
As for the weights assigned to each input, there is no previous guidance that would be of
use here. The rating agencies are just as hazy about how the weights are determined as they
are about the inputs they use. However, given that the main aim is to create ratings that
predict corporate bad behavior, I will take an agnostic approach by iterating through all the
possible combinations of weights on a three-dimensional grid for regulatory penalties, major
environmental lawsuits, and the number of negative environmental news events. Specifically,




envNewsEvents are selected such that
they maximize the overall predictive value, δ1/sd1 + δ2/sd2 + δ3/sd3. δ1, δ2, and δ3 are the
coefficients obtained from regressing log dollar penalties, the number of lawsuits, and the
negative CSR-related news index (RRI) in the following year on environmental ratings in
the current year.41 The coefficient estimates are scaled by the standard deviation of the
corresponding dependent variable to place equal emphasis on each of the three dimensions
of corporate bad behavior. To maintain comparability, the inputs are rescaled to be between
0 and 1 via min-max (i.e. because the minimum is zero, each input value is divided by its
maximum value in its corresponding year). The weights for social ratings, wSOCpenalties, w
SOC
lawsuits,
wSOCsocNewsEvents, are constructed using the same procedure.
For the corporate badness (CB) ratings to be useful to investors, they must be able to
demonstrate their predictive worth out-of-sample. Therefore, I break up the dataset roughly
into halves. The training period is from 2007 to 2011, and a testing sample is from 2012
40Yale Impact Investing Conference 2018
41I also include the lagged dependent variable to capture persistence.
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The CB ratings display several appealing qualities in its underlying methodology that
arguably make them superior to the commercial ratings. First and foremost is the trans-
parency and straightforward nature of the process used to calculate them from their three
key inputs. At no point did human judgment enter to influence the calculations. This in
turn enhances the reproducibility of these ratings. At a more fundamental level, the process
addresses the issue of greenwashing by carefully selecting inputs that do not include cor-
42In Appendix H, I also consider using only two inputs (e.g. lawsuits and news) to predict the third
outcome (e.g. penalties). The results work almost as well as the results from using all three inputs. My
methodology therefore is not primarily reliant on persistence of the dependent variable and demonstrates its
ability to predict corporate bad behavior outcomes of dimensions beyond those used initially as inputs.
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porate speech (of dubious veracity). Instead of importing sources that contain information
of questionable authenticity, I focus on a relatively objective information set on penalties,
lawsuits, and news articles. This is important as concerns among investors have recently
surfaced about the high environmental ratings that British Petroleum and Volkswagen re-
ceived leading up to their respective environmental scandals.43
3.4. Predictive Analysis
In this section, I will use the three benchmarks for corporate bad behavior described
earlier to assess the ratings from Thomson Reuters in an effort to investigate the possibility
of competition as a means to better ratings quality. I will then see how the CB ratings fare
against the same benchmarks as well as probe the financial implications, if any, being a dirty
business.
3.4.1. Thomson Reuters Ratings
Table 3.2 presents the first set of estimates for the predictive value of the environmental
ratings sold by Thomson Reuters with respect to the Reputational Risk Index (RRI). RRI,
which ranges from 0 (being the best) to 100 (being the worst), tracks the negative media
coverage related to CSR for a given firm every year. As it turns out, in Column 1, higher
(or better) environmental ratings predict on average more bad news in the following year.
Column 1 intentionally omits firm controls given that it is possible for environmental quality
to affect the dependent variable through its effect on a firm’s financial characteristics. A one
standard deviation increase in the environmental ratings results in roughly a one-fifth of a
standard deviation increase in the negative news. Column 2 shows that, upon controlling
for size (among other common features), the incremental predictive value of the ratings is
43Yale Impact Investing Conference 2018
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greatly attenuated though statistically significant. This is qualitatively consistent with the
results found in Chapter 2 about the MSCI environmental ratings. In both regressions, I
include a lagged news variable to account for persistence.
With regards to regulatory penalties, the predictive performance of the Thomson Reuters
environmental ratings tell the same tale. Better environmental ratings in Table 3.3 predict
more regulatory penalties, both total and environmental, in the future. In Column 1, a one
standard deviation increase in the environmental ratings again results in roughly a one-fifth
of a standard deviation increase in the adverse outcome of interest. Column 2 shows that
size absorbs much of the predictive value that otherwise would be attributed to environ-
mental ratings. Columns 3 and 4 indicate the ratings have very little to say about future
environmental penalties.
Lastly, for lawsuits, higher environmental ratings in Table 3.4 are indicative of more fu-
ture lawsuits, whether be it total lawsuits or only the environmental ones. In comparison
to the MSCI environmental ratings, it is interesting to note here that, across Columns 1
through 4, the predictive coefficients remain statistically significant even after controlling
for size and other characteristics. The lack of strong economic significance however suggests
that this distinction is, at best, of second-order importance.
Now for the social ratings from Thomson Reuters, they appear to behave in the same
way as their environmental counterparts by predicting more negative news in the future as
displayed in Table 3.5. The weak economic significance is quite similar with size eating up
a large amount of the predictive value coming from these ratings. Tables 3.6 and 3.7 reveal
essentially the same pattern of social ratings predicting more penalties and lawsuits in the
future. By contrast, Chapter 2 finds that MSCI social ratings were (weak) negative predic-
tors of these adverse outcomes. One possible explanation for the difference could be that
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the smaller rating agency, Thomson Reuters, utilizes more of the readily accessible corporate
propaganda among the inputs it dumps into its algorithm. The introduction of additional
greenwashed information could steer the sign of the predictive coefficient further in the pos-
itive direction.
3.4.2. The Corporate Badness (CB) Ratings
The Corporate Badness (CB) ratings range from 0 to 10. 0 indicates that the company
is free of regulatory penalties, lawsuits, and negative press related to CSR, and 10 indicates
that the company is very dirty. Hence, higher CB ratings depict a more negative view on the
company. Table 3.8 considers the same empirical specification as in Table 3.2 and presents
the exact opposite set of results. Worse CB environmental ratings correctly predict out-
of-sample more bad news in the future! In terms of economic significance, a one standard
deviation increase in the CB environmental ratings results in roughly a one-tenth of a stan-
dard deviation increase in the negative news in Column 1. Column 2 shows that this does
not change a lot after introducing the same set of firm controls. In both of these columns,
the CB ratings demonstrate themselves to be reflecting more than just persistence in the
dependent variable.
Table 3.9 shows that these findings are robust with regards to regulatory penalties, either
total or environmental. Controlling for firm characteristics like size does not hugely affect
the estimates of the predictive coefficient. Across all four columns, a one standard deviation
increase in the CB environmental ratings results in around 4 to 5 percent increase in dollar
regulatory penalties.
In the case of lawsuits, the CB environmental ratings are appear to perform pretty well
by having worse ratings predict more lawsuits in the future in Table 3.10. For environmental
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lawsuits in particular, the economic significance is quite strong as a one standard deviation
increase in the CB environmental ratings is associated with roughly a one standard deviation
increase in future environmental lawsuits. The only caveat is that these environmental rat-
ings do not appear to offer additional predictive value for lawsuits beyond existing common
financial characteristics of the firm.
Table 3.11 presents the predictive estimates of the CB social ratings for negative CSR-
related news. Again, worse CB social ratings forecast more bad news in the future. The
economic significance is similar to that of the CB environmental ratings. For regulatory
violations, the CB social ratings in Table 3.12 are correct in predicting more penalties in the
future when the social ratings are worse. The incremental predictive value beyond size and
other firm controls remains statistically significant though considerably weaker (by about
half) in magnitude. Table 3.13 shows that worse CB social ratings predict more lawsuits in
the future. For social lawsuits, a one standard deviation increase in the CB social ratings is
predicts about half a standard deviation increase in future social lawsuits. The absence of
incremental value beyond size in the case of lawsuits is one aspect to improve upon.
3.4.3. Does Being Socially Irresponsible Matter in Financial Terms?
The ability of the CB environmental and social ratings to predict right in the manner
corporate bad behavior in the future rests in the fact that firms that tend to be dirty today
will tend to be dirty tomorrow. This success of the CB ratings is valuable to socially con-
scious investors who seek to avoid finding themselves supporting businesses that prove to be
poor citizens. At the same time, there is the open question of whether corporate badness
matters for the financial performance of the firm. If so, corporate badness would plausibly
appeal to more than just the group of socially conscious investors.
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Table 3.14 considers future operating performance, as defined by return on assets (ROA).
Controlling for the same set of firm characteristics, I find that the state of corporate badness,
for both environmental and social categories, says nothing about how a company’s future
operating income. In fact, the magnitudes of the estimates are basically unchanged when
adjusting the persistence of ROA. The same is essentially true for firm value, or Tobin’s Q,
in Table 3.15. The one difference is that corporate environmental badness may appear to
have some borderline predictive value in Column 1. The sharp decline in the magnitude
of the coefficient in Column 2 suggests that corporate environmental badness predicts little
about firm value beyond persistence.
Given current interest in mitigating downside risk with CSR (e.g. Hoepner, Oikonomou,
Sautner, Starks, Zhou (2016)), I consider downside risk, measured from negative daily re-
turns, as a third financial outcome of interest in Table 3.16. Here, I find that corporate
environmental badness displays no relation to future downsize risk. On the other hand,
corporate social badness seems to be somewhat important for downside risk in the following
year. Overall, the absence of a tight link between corporate badness and financial outcomes
point to social irresponsibility by businesses as being a feature whose interest in largely mo-
tivated by social preferences.
3.4.4. Ratings Disagreement
Identifying the amount of greenwashing is a challenging feat. After all, it is the intent
of greenwashing to not be detected. In some cases, a serious investigation by, for instance,
a government authority is required to separate the phony from the real. Moreover, the
disaggregated nature of this information poses a barrier to those who seek to compile a com-
prehensive dataset that contains information about greenwashing.
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Despite these data-related challenges with trying to directly observe greenwashing, the
CB ratings present the opportunity for an alternative approach to tackling this problem of
identifying greenwashing. In particular, if the CB ratings measure true corporate social irre-
sponsibility, then the difference between the MSCI ratings and the CB ratings should provide
an indication of the extent to which MSCI ratings diverge from a correct measure of CSR.
This divergence should be closely related to the influence of greenwashing on MSCI’s ratings.
To make scaling more comparable, I define disagreement as MSCI Rating - (10 - CB Rating).
As it turns out, for environmental ratings, higher levels of disagreement, which is de-
signed to capture manipulation, strongly predicts more total regulatory penalties in Column
1 of Table 3.17. More importantly, in a regression that exclude ratings disagreement, MSCI
environmental ratings by themselves predict more penalties in the future, but then when the
ratings disagreement is included, they predict less penalties! This suggests the MSCI rating
contains useful information but that useful component is negatively correlated with green-
washing. By introducing the disagreement measure into the regression, I can disentangle
the separate predictive effects of accurate information and greenwashing that are otherwise
been lumped together. The coefficients of disagreement and the MSCI environmental rating
are both statistically significant even with controlling for size in Column 4. These predictive
effects are economically significant as well. A one standard deviation increase in either term
forecasts a half standard deviation increase in environmental penalties.
A similar finding emerges for social ratings, which also suffers from greenwashing. Ta-
ble 3.18, Column 1 shows that higher social rating disagreement predicts more regulatory
penalties while better MSCI social ratings now strongly predicts less regulatory penalties in
the following year. Again, the result is robust to adjusting for firm size in Column 4. The
economic significance is slightly weaker as a one standard deviation increase in either term
forecasts a one third standard deviation increase in social penalties.
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Table 3.19 reports the case where the dependent variable is the negative news related
to corporate social responsibility. For both environmental and social dimensions, better
MSCI ratings correctly predict less negative news in the future upon controlling for ratings
disagreement. The economic significance is comparable in magnitude to the case with regu-
latory penalties.
Lastly, with lawsuits, the pattern remains somewhat similar. Column 1 in Tables 3.20
and 3.21 shows that ratings disagreement positively predicts more future total lawsuits while
the MSCI ratings themselves predict less of such lawsuits. However, upon conditioning on
size, neither offer any predictive value of statistical significance as lawsuits tend to be rather
noisy and more sporadic. Columns 3 and 4 in both tables indicate dramatically lower R-
squared values, which point to environmental and social lawsuits as harder outcomes to
explain than penalties and news. In helping to construct the CB ratings, environmental and
social lawsuits received only 10 and 15 percent in weights, respectively.
To address concerns that the CB ratings may be vulnerable to manipulation, it is worth
noting that CB ratings and disagreement are poorly correlated (i.e. around 20 percent) for
both environmental and social. On the other hand, the MSCI ratings are positively corre-
lated with disagreement at around 90 percent. The low correlation with disagreement for CB
ratings implies that these ratings are unlikely to experience the kind of severe manipulation
seen in MSCI ratings.
3.5. Conclusion
Prompted by the revelations of serious flaws with the leading commercial environmental
and social ratings, I investigate alternative signals that may serve as a solution to the problem
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of poor predictability with regards to corporate bad behavior. Although competition among
rating agencies offers a theoretically promising route to better ratings quality, I find no such
evidence with a recently emerged rival, Thomson Reuters. I however establish the foundation
for a viable alternative through the introduction of Corporate Badness (CB) ratings that
do in the right manner predict future regulatory penalties, lawsuits, and negative press
coverage related to social responsibility out-of-sample. The Corporate Badness (CB) ratings
has the appealing features of being transparent with its construction as well its reliance on
relatively objective inputs. Furthermore, the CB ratings provide a basis for assessing the
extent of greenwashing through its disagreement with the MSCI ratings studied in Chapter
2. For the most part, I find that the ratings disagreement measure successfully isolates the
manipulation from the MSCI ratings, which strongly predict corporate bad behavior in the
correct direction upon controlling for ratings disagreement.
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Table 3.1 Summary Statistics of CSR Ratings and Corporate Bad Behavior.
Time Period: 2007-2015
Thomson Reuters CSR Ratings
Observations Mean Standard Deviation
Environmental 6706 46.945 23.111
Social 6706 51.578 19.321
Corporate Bad Behavior
Observations Mean Standard Deviation
Reg. Penalties (in log millions) 6706 0.115 0.612
Env. Reg. Penalties (in log millions) 6706 0.025 0.243
Soc. Reg. Penalties (in log millions) 6706 0.015 0.119
Number of Major Lawsuits 6706 0.384 1.216
Number of Major Env. Lawsuits 6706 0.012 0.121
Number of Major Soc. Lawsuits 6706 0.044 0.273
RRI (i.e. CSR-related news index) 6706 5.481 10.913
Time Period: 2012-2015
Corporate Badness (CB) Rating
Observations Mean Standard Deviation
Environmental 7762 0.045 0.258
Social 7762 0.062 0.274
Corporate Bad Behavior
Observations Mean Standard Deviation
Reg. Penalties (in log millions) 7762 0.134 0.689
Env. Reg. Penalties (in log millions) 7762 0.026 0.254
Soc. Reg. Penalties (in log millions) 7762 0.013 0.114
Number of Major Lawsuits 7762 0.355 1.010
Number of Major Env. Lawsuits 7762 0.013 0.113
Number of Major Soc. Lawsuits 7762 0.064 0.327
RRI (i.e. CSR-related news index) 7762 7.341 11.996
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Table 3.2 Thomson Reuters Environmental Ratings and Negative CSR-related
News. This table reports the estimation results of regressions where the dependent variable
is the Reputational Risk Index (RRI), a news-based measure of incidents related to corporate
social responsibility (i.e. December of the following year). Standard errors, clustered by
three-digit SIC codes, are reported in parentheses. Significance at the ten percent level is
given by *; at the five percent level **, at the one percent level ***.
(1) (2)
Negative CSR-related Negative CSR-related
Newsi,t Newsi,t
Environmental Ratingi,t−1 0.109*** 0.041***
(0.011) (0.008)
Negative CSR-related Newsi,t−1 0.519*** 0.402***
(0.029) (0.026)
Controls? No Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes




Table 3.3 Thomson Reuters Environmental Ratings and Regulatory Violations.
This table reports the estimation results of regressions where the dependent variables are 1)
log values of total penalties assessed through regulatory action (both civil and criminal) in
the U.S. and 2) log values of environmental. Explanatory variables are lagged by one year.
Standard errors, clustered by three-digit SIC codes, are reported in parentheses. Significance
at the ten percent level is given by *; at the five percent level **, at the one percent level
***.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Total Environmental Environmental
Penaltiesi,t Penaltiesi,t Penaltiesi,t Penaltiesi,t
Environmental Ratingi,t−1 0.005*** 0.0002 0.001*** 0.0001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Total Penaltiesi,t−1 0.293*** 0.256***
(0.115) (0.107)
Environmental Penaltiesi,t−1 0.029 0.027
(0.029) (0.028)
Controls? No Yes No Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6706 6706 6706 6706
R2 0.206 0.229 0.088 0.091
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Table 3.4 Thomson Reuters Environmental Ratings and Litigation. This table
reports the estimation results of regressions where the dependent variables are the number
of lawsuits in the following year. Standard errors, clustered by three-digit SIC codes, are
reported in parentheses. No firm characteristics from previously are included as controls.
Significance at the ten percent level is given by *; at the five percent level **, at the one
percent level ***. For these negative binomial models, the adjusted McFadden R-squared is
reported.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Total Environmental Environmental
Lawsuitsi,t Lawsuitsi,t Lawsuitsi,t Lawsuitsi,t
Environmental Ratingi,t−1 0.012*** 0.004*** 0.034*** 0.022***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.006)
Total Lawsuitsi,t−1 0.167*** 0.128***
(0.010) (0.013)
Environmental Lawsuitsi,t−1 0.322 0.258
(0.236) (0.208)
Controls? No Yes No Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6706 6706 6706 6706
R2 0.520 0.535 0.137 0.150
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Table 3.5 Thomson Reuters Social Ratings and Negative CSR-related News.
This table reports the estimation results of regressions where the dependent variable is the
Reputational Risk Index (RRI), a news-based measure of incidents related to corporate social
responsibility (i.e. December of the following year). Standard errors, clustered by three-digit
SIC codes, are reported in parentheses. Significance at the ten percent level is given by *;
at the five percent level **, at the one percent level ***.
(1) (2)
Negative CSR-related Negative CSR-related
Newsi,t Newsi,t
Social Ratingi,t−1 0.125*** 0.046***
(0.011) (0.010)
Negative CSR-related Newsi,t−1 0.521*** 0.402***
(0.031) (0.025)
Controls? No Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes




Table 3.6 Thomson Reuters Social Ratings and Regulatory Violations. This table
reports the estimation results of regressions where the dependent variables are 1) log values of
total penalties assessed through regulatory action (both civil and criminal) in the U.S. and 2)
log values of social. Explanatory variables are lagged by one year. Standard errors, clustered
by three-digit SIC codes, are reported in parentheses. Significance at the ten percent level
is given by *; at the five percent level **, at the one percent level ***.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Total Social Social
Penaltiesi,t Penaltiesi,t Penaltiesi,t Penaltiesi,t
Social Ratingi,t−1 0.005*** 0.0001 0.001*** 0.0001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Total Penaltiesi,t−1 0.294*** 0.256***
(0.116) (0.107)
Social Penaltiesi,t−1 0.076* 0.066
(0.042) (0.041)
Controls? No Yes No Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6706 6706 6706 6706
R2 0.205 0.229 0.057 0.062
86
Table 3.7 Thomson Reuters Social Ratings and Litigation. This table reports the
estimation results of regressions where the dependent variables are the number of lawsuits
in the following year. Standard errors, clustered by three-digit SIC codes, are reported in
parentheses. No firm characteristics from previously are included as controls. Significance
at the ten percent level is given by *; at the five percent level **, at the one percent level
***. For these negative binomial models, the adjusted McFadden R-squared is reported.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Total Social Social
Lawsuitsi,t Lawsuitsi,t Lawsuitsi,t Lawsuitsi,t
Social Ratingi,t−1 0.013*** 0.003* 0.024*** 0.012***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
Total Lawsuitsi,t−1 0.168*** 0.128***
(0.010) (0.013)
Social Lawsuitsi,t−1 0.198*** 0.170***
(0.043) (0.048)
Controls? No Yes No Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6706 6706 6706 6706
R2 0.519 0.535 0.262 0.272
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Table 3.8 Corporate Badness (CB) Environmental Ratings and Negative CSR-
related News. This table reports the estimation results of regressions where the dependent
variable is the Reputational Risk Index (RRI), a news-based measure of incidents related
to corporate social responsibility (i.e. December of the following year). Standard errors,
clustered by three-digit SIC codes, are reported in parentheses. Significance at the ten
percent level is given by *; at the five percent level **, at the one percent level ***.
(1) (2)
Negative CSR-related Negative CSR-related
Newsi,t Newsi,t
CB Environmental Ratingi,t−1 4.230*** 3.482***
(0.848) (0.761)
Negative CSR-related Newsi,t−1 0.634*** 0.405***
(0.024) (0.027)
Controls? No Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes




Table 3.9 Corporate Badness (CB) Environmental Ratings and Regulatory Vi-
olations. This table reports the estimation results of regressions where the dependent
variables are 1) log values of total penalties assessed through regulatory action (both civil
and criminal) in the U.S. and 2) log values of environmental. Explanatory variables are
lagged by one year. Standard errors, clustered by three-digit SIC codes, are reported in
parentheses. Significance at the ten percent level is given by *; at the five percent level **,
at the one percent level ***.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Total Environmental Environmental
Penaltiesi,t Penaltiesi,t Penaltiesi,t Penaltiesi,t
CB Environmental Ratingi,t−1 0.200*** 0.148*** 0.235*** 0.198***
(0.071) (0.054) (0.047) (0.045)
Total Penaltiesi,t−1 0.398*** 0.240***
(0.111) (0.072)
Environmental Penaltiesi,t−1 -0.051 -0.034
(0.034) (0.048)
Controls? No Yes No Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7762 5553 7762 5553
R2 0.247 0.256 0.101 0.114
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Table 3.10 Corporate Badness (CB) Environmental Ratings and Litigation. This
table reports the estimation results of regressions where the dependent variables are the
number of lawsuits in the following year. Standard errors, clustered by three-digit SIC
codes, are reported in parentheses. No firm characteristics from previously are included as
controls. Significance at the ten percent level is given by *; at the five percent level **,
at the one percent level ***. For these negative binomial models, the adjusted McFadden
R-squared is reported.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Total Environmental Environmental
Lawsuitsi,t Lawsuitsi,t Lawsuitsi,t Lawsuitsi,t
CB Environmental Ratingi,t−1 0.322*** 0.001 0.609** -0.038
(0.072) (0.048) (0.244) (0.144)
Total Lawsuitsi,t−1 0.349*** 0.226***
(0.015) (0.015)
Environmental Lawsuitsi,t−1 -0.783 -0.892*
(0.540) (0.479)
Controls? No Yes No Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7762 5553 7762 5553
R2 0.394 0.432 0.429 0.504
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Table 3.11 Corporate Badness (CB) Social Ratings and Negative CSR-related
News. This table reports the estimation results of regressions where the dependent variable
is the Reputational Risk Index (RRI), a news-based measure of incidents related to corporate
social responsibility (i.e. December of the following year). Standard errors, clustered by
three-digit SIC codes, are reported in parentheses. Significance at the ten percent level is
given by *; at the five percent level **, at the one percent level ***.
(1) (2)
Negative CSR-related Negative CSR-related
Newsi,t Newsi,t
CB Social Ratingi,t−1 5.920*** 4.592***
(0.858) (0.904)
Negative CSR-related Newsi,t−1 0.602*** 0.389***
(0.023) (0.027)
Controls? No Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes




Table 3.12 Corporate Badness (CB) Social Ratings and Regulatory Violations.
This table reports the estimation results of regressions where the dependent variables are 1)
log values of total penalties assessed through regulatory action (both civil and criminal) in
the U.S. and 2) log values of social. Explanatory variables are lagged by one year. Standard
errors, clustered by three-digit SIC codes, are reported in parentheses. Significance at the
ten percent level is given by *; at the five percent level **, at the one percent level ***.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Total Social Social
Penaltiesi,t Penaltiesi,t Penaltiesi,t Penaltiesi,t
CB Social Ratingi,t−1 0.399*** 0.194*** 0.049*** 0.026**
(0.112) (0.060) (0.015) (0.012)
Total Penaltiesi,t−1 0.366*** 0.236***
(0.093) (0.072)
Social Penaltiesi,t−1 0.001 0.058
(0.049) (0.048)
Controls? No Yes No Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7762 5553 7762 5553
R2 0.257 0.262 0.061 0.104
92
Table 3.13 Corporate Badness (CB) Social Ratings and Litigation. This table
reports the estimation results of regressions where the dependent variables are the number
of lawsuits in the following year. Standard errors, clustered by three-digit SIC codes, are
reported in parentheses. Significance at the ten percent level is given by *; at the five
percent level **, at the one percent level ***. For these negative binomial models, the
adjusted McFadden R-squared is reported.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Total Social Social
Lawsuitsi,t Lawsuitsi,t Lawsuitsi,t Lawsuitsi,t
CB Social Ratingi,t−1 0.373*** -0.044 0.565*** -0.171
(0.084) (0.081) (0.111) (0.138)
Total Lawsuitsi,t−1 0.335*** 0.228***
(0.015) (0.015)
Social Lawsuitsi,t−1 0.355*** 0.243***
(0.105) (0.075)
Controls? No Yes No Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7762 5553 7762 5553
R2 0.395 0.432 0.318 0.394
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Table 3.14 Corporate Bad Behavior and Future Operation Performance. This
table reports the estimation results of regressions where the dependent variable is the oper-
ating performance in the following year. Standard errors, clustered by three-digit SIC codes,
are reported in parentheses. Significance at the ten percent level is given by *; at the five
percent level **, at the one percent level ***.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ROAi,t ROAi,t ROAi,t ROAi,t
CB Environmental Ratingi,t−1 0.001 0.001
(0.005) (0.002)




Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3193 3097 3193 3079
R2 0.472 0.824 0.472 0.810
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Table 3.15 Corporate Bad Behavior and Future Firm Value. This table reports the
estimation results of regressions where the dependent variable is firm value in the following
year. Standard errors, clustered by three-digit SIC codes, are reported in parentheses. Sig-
nificance at the ten percent level is given by *; at the five percent level **, at the one percent
level ***.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Firm Valuei,t Firm Valuei,t Firm Valuei,t Firm Valuei,t
CB Environmental Ratingi,t−1 0.196* 0.052
(0.102) (0.040)
CB Social Ratingi,t−1 -0.010 -0.021
(0.072) (0.028)
Firm Valuei,t−1 0.794*** 0.794***
(0.046) (0.046)
Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3505 3483 3505 3483
R2 0.392 0.744 0.391 0.744
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Table 3.16 Corporate Bad Behavior and Downside Risk. This table reports the
estimation results of regressions where the dependent variable is the downside variance in
the following year. Standard errors, clustered by three-digit SIC codes, are reported in
parentheses. Significance at the ten percent level is given by *; at the five percent level **,
at the one percent level ***.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Down. Riski,t Down. Riski,t Down. Riski,t Down. Riski,t
CB Env. Ratingi,t−1 0.002 0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
CB Soc. Ratingi,t−1 0.006* 0.005*
(0.003) (0.003)
Down. Riski,t−1 0.304*** 0.303***
(0.082) (0.082)
Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3616 3614 3616 3614
R2 0.226 0.293 0.228 0.294
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Table 3.17 MSCI-CB Environmental Ratings Disagreement and Regulatory
Penalties. This table reports the estimation results of regressions where the dependent
variable is the regulatory penalties in the following year. MSCI-CB ENV is the difference
between the MSCI environmental rating and the CB environmental rating. Standard er-
rors, clustered by three-digit SIC codes, are reported in parentheses. Significance at the ten
percent level is given by *; at the five percent level **, at the one percent level ***.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Total Environmental Environmental
Penaltiesi,t Penaltiesi,t Penaltiesi,t Penaltiesi,t
MSCI-CB ENVi,t−1 1.141*** 0.357 1.095*** 0.758***
(0.393) (0.261) (0.292) (0.250)
MSCI Env. Ratingi,t−1 -0.967** -0.376 -0.988*** -0.735***
(0.396) (0.257) (0.289) (0.246)
Total Penaltiesi,t−1 0.310*** 0.239***
(0.030) (0.024)
Environmental Penaltiesi,t−1 0.209*** 0.183***
(0.051) (0.047)
Controls? No Yes No Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4606 4606 4606 4606
Adj. R2 0.333 0.367 0.264 0.277
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Table 3.18 MSCI-CB Social Ratings Disagreement and Regulatory Penalties.
This table reports the estimation results of regressions where the dependent variable is the
regulatory penalties in the following year. MSCI-CB SOC is the difference between the
MSCI social rating and the CB social rating. Standard errors, clustered by three-digit SIC
codes, are reported in parentheses. Significance at the ten percent level is given by *; at the
five percent level **, at the one percent level ***.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Total Social Social
Penaltiesi,t Penaltiesi,t Penaltiesi,t Penaltiesi,t
MSCI-CB SOCi,t−1 1.298*** 0.269 1.689*** 0.780***
(0.287) (0.264) (0.319) (0.292)
MSCI Soc. Ratingi,t−1 -1.409*** -0.338 -1.830*** -0.880***
(0.293) (0.269) (0.318) (0.286)
Total Penaltiesi,t−1 0.306*** 0.238***
(0.031) (0.024)
Social Penaltiesi,t−1 0.195*** 0.143***
(0.035) (0.037)
Controls? No Yes No Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4606 4606 4606 4606
Adj. R2 0.332 0.367 0.269 0.299
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Table 3.19 MSCI-CB Ratings Disagreement and Negative CSR-related News.
This table reports the estimation results of regressions where the dependent variable is the
Reputational Risk Index (RRI), a news-based measure of incidents related to CSR in the
following year. MSCI-CB ENV (SOC) is the difference between the MSCI environmental
(social) rating and the CB environmental (social) rating. Standard errors, clustered by three-
digit SIC codes, are reported in parentheses. Significance at the ten percent level is given
by *; at the five percent level **, at the one percent level ***.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Negative CSR Negative CSR Negative CSR Negative CSR
Newsi,t Newsi,t Newsi,t Newsi,t
MSCI-CB ENVi,t−1 3.251*** 2.681***
(0.659) (0.457)
MSCI Env. Ratingi,t−1 -2.414*** -2.433***
(0.666) (0.470)
MSCI-CB SOCi,t−1 4.119*** 3.292***
(0.873) (0.672)
MSCI Soc. Ratingi,t−1 -4.287*** -3.404***
(0.904) (0.682)
Negative CSR Newsi,t−1 0.619*** 0.385*** 0.623*** 0.369***
(0.033) (0.031) (0.030) (0.029)
Controls? No Yes No Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4222 4222 4222 4222
Adj. R2 0.629 0.694 0.625 0.696
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Table 3.20 MSCI-CB Environmental Ratings Disagreement and Litigation. This
table reports the estimation results of regressions where the dependent variable is the num-
ber of lawsuits in the following year. MSCI-CB ENV is the difference between the MSCI
environmental rating and the CB environmental rating. Standard errors, clustered by three-
digit SIC codes, are reported in parentheses. Significance at the ten percent level is given
by *; at the five percent level **, at the one percent level ***.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Total Environmental Environmental
Lawsuitsi,t Lawsuitsi,t Lawsuitsi,t Lawsuitsi,t
MSCI-CB ENVi,t−1 0.244*** -0.004 0.067* -0.156
(0.083) (0.038) (0.038) (0.109)
MSCI Env. Ratingi,t−1 -0.166* 0.012 0.119 0.219*
(0.085) (0.041) (0.081) (0.116)
Total Lawsuitsi,t−1 0.191*** 0.118***
(0.007) (0.009)
Environmental Lawsuitsi,t−1 0.255 0.333
(0.263) (0.265)
Controls? No Yes No Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3173 3173 3173 3173
Adj. R2 0.359 0.408 0.011 0.038
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Table 3.21 MSCI-CB Social Ratings Disagreement and Litigation. This table re-
ports the estimation results of regressions where the dependent variable is the number of
lawsuits in the following year. MSCI-CB SOC is the difference between the MSCI social
rating and the CB social rating. Standard errors, clustered by three-digit SIC codes, are
reported in parentheses. Significance at the ten percent level is given by *; at the five percent
level **, at the one percent level ***.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Total Social Social
Lawsuitsi,t Lawsuitsi,t Lawsuitsi,t Lawsuitsi,t
MSCI-CB SOCi,t−1 0.242*** -0.077* 0.419*** -0.121
(0.065) (0.045) (0.117) (0.108)
MSCI Soc. Ratingi,t−1 -0.248*** 0.078* -0.370*** 0.187*
(0.065) (0.045) (0.116) (0.097)
Total Lawsuitsi,t−1 0.199*** 0.121***
(0.007) (0.009)
Social Lawsuitsi,t−1 0.239*** 0.197***
(0.038) (0.052)
Controls? No Yes No Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3173 3173 3173 3173
Adj. R2 0.351 0.408 0.175 0.182
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Appendices
Appendix A - Proof of Proposition 1
With normally distributed cash flows and CARA preferences, the individual non-SR
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Applying the market clearing conditions from above then gives the equilibrium prices.
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Appendix B - Ratings Determinants
Ratings Determinants. This table reports the estimation results of regressions where
the dependent variables are ratings on corporate environmental and social performance.
Explanatory variables are lagged by one year. Standard errors, clustered by three-digit SIC
codes, are reported in parentheses. Significance at the ten percent level is given by *; at the
five percent level **, at the one percent level ***.
(1) (2)
Environmental Rating Social Rating



























Downside Variance 0.605 -0.506
(0.469) (0.457)
Year FE? Yes Yes
Industry FE? Yes Yes
Observations 7692 7692
Adj. R-squared 0.457 0.202
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Appendix C - Types of Primary Regulatory Offenses
Types of Primary Regulatory Offenses. This table displays the 59 categories of violations found in the Violations
Tracker from Goodjobsfirst.org. Specific penalty category related to a company’s environmental (social) characteristic is in bold
(italics).
Categories
accounting fraud or deficiencies agribusiness violation
Americans with Disabilities Act anti-money-laundering deficiencies
aviation consumer protection violation aviation safety violation
banking violation benefit plan administrator violation
consumer protection violation Controlled Substances Act violation
data submission deficiencies discriminatory practices
drug or medical equipment safety violation economic sanction violation
employment discrimination energy market violation
environmental violation excise tax violation
export control violation False Claims Act
Family and Medical Leave Act federal leasing royalty violation
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act fraud
HHS civil monetary penalties investor protection violation
kickbacks and bribery labor relations violation
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Medicare Parts C and D Enforcement Action motor vehicle safety violation
nuclear safety violation off-label/unapproved promotion of medical products
price-fixing or anti-competitive practices product safety violation
railroad safety violation securities issuance or trading violation
telecommunications violation toxic securities abuses
Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act wage and hour violation
workplace safety or health violation child labor or youth employment violation
financial institution supervision failures mortgage abuses
tobacco litigation workplace whistleblower retaliation
employment screening violation food safety violation
illicit political contributions premerger notification violation
Servicemembers Civil Relief Act energy market manipulation
insider trading payday lending violation
tax violations interest rate benchmark manipulation
student loan abuses foreign exchange market manipulation
maritime violation
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Appendix D: Alternative Predictive Specifications (Differences)
Alternative Predictive Specifications (Differences). This table reports the esti-
mation results of alternative predictive specifications for environmental and social ratings.
Explanatory variables are lagged by one year. Columns 1 and 3 control for firm character-
istics. Columns 2 and 4 have controls in differences. Standard errors, clustered by firm,
are reported in parentheses. Significance at the ten percent level is given by *; at the five
percent level **, at the one percent level ***.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Neg. Newsi,t Neg. Newsi,t Neg. Newsi,t Neg. Newsi,t
Env.i,t−1 -0.013 -0.088
(0.159) (0.228)




∆ Soc.i,t−1 0.178 0.170
(0.150) (0.150)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tot. Lawsuitsi,t Tot. Lawsuitsi,t Tot. Lawsuitsi,t Tot. Lawsuitsi,t
Env.i,t−1 -0.013 -0.015
(0.019) (0.019)




∆ Soc.i,t−1 -0.015 -0.016
(0.015) (0.016)
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Env. Lawsuitsi,t Env. Lawsuitsi,t Env. Lawsuitsi,t Env. Lawsuitsi,t
Env.i,t−1 -0.029 -0.017
(0.093) (0.087)
∆ Env.i,t−1 -0.116 -0.047
(0.103) (0.100)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Soc. Lawsuitsi,t Soc. Lawsuitsi,t Soc. Lawsuitsi,t Soc. Lawsuitsi,t
Soc.i,t−1 0.089 0.082
(0.071) (0.071)
∆ Soc.i,t−1 0.036 0.041
(0.052) (0.055)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tot. Penaltiesi,t Tot. Penaltiesi,t Tot. Penaltiesi,t Tot. Penaltiesi,t
Env.i,t−1 -0.018 0.051
(0.073) (0.117)




∆ Soc.i,t−1 0.010 0.012
(0.065) (0.066)
(1) (2) (3) (4)




∆ Env.i,t−1 0.059 0.052
(0.048) (0.048)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Soc. Penaltiesi,t Soc. Penaltiesi,t Soc. Penaltiesi,t Soc. Penaltiesi,t
Soc.i,t−1 -0.003 -0.047
(0.056) (0.090)
∆ Soc.i,t−1 -0.007 -0.009
(0.057) (0.057)
Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Appendix E: Noisy Price Inference
In this part of the appendix, I consider extending the baseline model to the case where
socially responsible investors are allowed to infer from noisy prices about firm type.
The supply of shares sold to investors are
N̂rg = Nrg +mg
N̂rb = Nrb +mb
, where mg, mb are independent and normally distributed with means zero and variances
σmg , σmb , respectively.
The prices of the good-rated and bad-rated are
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The optimal allocations are
x∗pSR,Phigh =
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A(σ4c − σ2c )
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Phigh refers to the relative positions and can be either Prg , which means the investor got
it “right” by conditioning on Phigh instead of rg, or Prb , which means the investor got it
“wrong”.
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P(ω = g|p = Phigh) =
P(p = Phigh|ω = g)P(ω = g)
P(p = Phigh|ω = g)P(ω = g) + P(p = Phigh|ω = b)P(ω = b)
, where P(p = Phigh|ω = g) can be decomposed into the sum of P(p = Phigh, r = rg|ω = g)
and P(p = Phigh, r = rb|ω = g).
P(p = Phigh, r = rg|ω = g) can be expressed as the product of P(p = Phigh|r = rg, ω = g)
and P(r = rg|ω = g), where the first term is equivalent to P(P̂rg > P̂rb) and the second term
is the effort of the rating agency e. P(p = Phigh, r = rg|ω = g) is equal to P(P̂rg < P̂rb)(1−e).
The other probabilities in the utility function can be computed in a similar fashion.
To compute P(P̂rg > P̂rb), note that P̂rg− P̂rb is normally distributed with mean Prg−Prb












, where Φ(·) is the cumulative distribution function.
For P(P̂rg > P̂rb), as its numerator increases (e.g. more demand for SRI), or its denomi-
nator decreases (i.e. prices are less noisy), P(Phigh = Prg) increases up to a maximum of 1,
which is the case of prices being fully revealing. As its numerator decreases, or its denomi-
nator increases, P(Phigh = Prg) decreases with a minimum of one half.
Below is a figure that traces out the total revenue of the rating agency when SR investors
can infer from noisy prices next to the original total revenue curve. For low numbers of
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SR investors, prices are not greatly informative so the two curves are very close to each
other. As the number of SR investors increase, prices become better signals. Hence, the
total revenue in the price-inference case falls relative to the total revenue in the baseline
model because the fee per investor that the rating agency can extract (i.e. UiSR − UpSR) is
less than UiSR−UuSR. Allowing for investors to infer from prices only serves to diminish the
total revenue of the rating agency and therefore to weaken its incentives to exert effort even
further.






















Total Revenue of the Rating Agency with Price Inference
Total Revenue of the Rating Agency with Price Inference. This figure plots the
original curve for the total revenue of the rating agency alongside the total revenue curves of
the rating when socially responsible investors are allowed to infer from prices that are noisy
(e.g. Low, Medium, High correspond to the standard deviations of the supply shock being
30, 35, 40, respectively.)
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Appendix F: No Effect on Corporate Governance Ratings
The Impact on Corporate Governance Ratings from a Government Clampdown
on Greenwashing. This table reports the estimation results of regressions where the
dependent variable are corporate governance ratings from 2012 to 2013. Around the end of
2012, the Federal Trade Commission enacted a ruling that was aimed at curtailing unfair
or deceptive claims by businesses related to sustainability and the environment. The policy
targeted marketing information as conveyed to consumers. Standard errors clustered by
industry are reported in parentheses. B2C is equal to 1 if firm i belongs to the treated
group, i.e. business-to-consumer industry j. Significance at the ten percent level is given by
*; at the five percent level **, at the one percent level ***.
(1) (2)
Governance Ratingi,t Governance Ratingi,t
B2Cj x PostPeriodt -0.153 -0.017
(0.465) (0.460)
Controls? No Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes
Industry FE? Yes Yes
Observations 1874 1874
Adj. R2 0.152 0.181
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Appendix G: Alternative Predictive Specifications (Bins)
Environmental Rating Bins and Regulatory Penalties. This table reports the es-
timation results of regressions where the dependent variable is the regulatory penalties in
the following year. Environmental ratings, ranging from 0 to 10 on a continuous scale, are
divided into 4 bins (i.e. Bin 4 corresponds to ratings that are between 7.5 to 10; Bin 3
refers to 5 to 7.5, etc.). Standard errors, clustered by three-digit SIC codes, are reported in
parentheses. Significance at the ten percent level is given by *; at the five percent level **,
at the one percent level ***.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Total Environmental Environmental
Penaltiesi,t Penaltiesi,t Penaltiesi,t Penaltiesi,t
Environmental Rating Bin 2i,t−1 0.292 0.003 0.426* 0.310
(0.234) (0.230) (0.229) (0.213)
Environmental Rating Bin 3i,t−1 0.687*** 0.025 0.570** 0.305
(0.242) (0.242) (0.244) (0.223)
Environmental Rating Bin 4i,t−1 1.585*** 0.093 0.771*** 0.152
(0.329) (0.310) (0.278) (0.242)
Total Penaltiesi,t−1 0.312*** 0.237***
(0.027) (0.021)
Environmental Penaltiesi,t−1 0.210*** 0.181***
(0.045) (0.041)
Controls? No Yes No Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6481 6481 6481 6481
Adj. R2 0.321 0.357 0.238 0.252
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Social Ratings and Regulatory Penalties. This table reports the estimation results
of regressions where the dependent variable is the regulatory penalties in the following year.
Social ratings, ranging from 0 to 10 on a continuous scale, are divided into 4 bins (i.e. Bin
4 corresponds to ratings that are between 7.5 to 10; Bin 3 refers to 5 to 7.5, etc.). Standard
errors, clustered by three-digit SIC codes, are reported in parentheses. Significance at the
ten percent level is given by *; at the five percent level **, at the one percent level ***.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Total Social Social
Penaltiesi,t Penaltiesi,t Penaltiesi,t Penaltiesi,t
Social Rating Bin 2i,t−1 -0.425*** -0.200 -0.458*** -0.274*
(0.178) (0.172) (0.160) (0.141)
Social Rating Bin 3i,t−1 -0.624*** -0.324* -0.571*** -0.332**
(0.201) (0.192) (0.180) (0.159)
Social Rating Bin 4i,t−1 -0.466 -0.398 -0.454 -0.393
(0.362) (0.351) (0.360) (0.327)
Total Penaltiesi,t−1 0.319*** 0.237***
(0.027) (0.021)
Social Penaltiesi,t−1 0.266*** 0.210***
(0.026) (0.023)
Controls? No Yes No Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6481 6481 6481 6481
Adj. R2 0.317 0.357 0.280 0.310
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Environmental Ratings and Litigation. This table reports the estimation results of
regressions where the dependent variable is the number of lawsuits in the following year.
Environmental ratings, ranging from 0 to 10 on a continuous scale, are divided into 4 bins
(i.e. Bin 4 corresponds to ratings that are between 7.5 to 10; Bin 3 refers to 5 to 7.5, etc.).
Standard errors, clustered by three-digit SIC codes, are reported in parentheses. Significance
at the ten percent level is given by *; at the five percent level **, at the one percent level
***.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Total Environmental Environmental
Lawsuitsi,t Lawsuitsi,t Lawsuitsi,t Lawsuitsi,t
Environmental Rating Bin 2i,t−1 0.042 -0.071 0.109 -0.210
(0.081) (0.075) (0.276) (0.270)
Environmental Rating Bin 3i,t−1 0.200* -0.058 0.641** 0.037
(0.104) (0.105) (0.306) (0.315)
Environmental Rating Bin 4i,t−1 0.516*** -0.077 0.559*** -0.562
(0.127) (0.128) (0.359) (0.462)
Total Lawsuitsi,t−1 0.204*** 0.123***
(0.006) (0.008)
Environmental Lawsuitsi,t−1 0.388* 0.287
(0.204) (0.199)
Controls? No Yes No Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8262 8262 8262 8262
Adj. R2 0.359 0.406 0.079 0.116
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Social Ratings and Litigation. This table reports the estimation results of regressions
where the dependent variable is the number of lawsuits in the following year. Social ratings,
ranging from 0 to 10 on a continuous scale, are divided into 4 bins (i.e. Bin 4 corresponds to
ratings that are between 7.5 to 10; Bin 3 refers to 5 to 7.5, etc.).Standard errors, clustered
by three-digit SIC codes, are reported in parentheses. Significance at the ten percent level
is given by *; at the five percent level **, at the one percent level ***.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Total Social Social
Lawsuitsi,t Lawsuitsi,t Lawsuitsi,t Lawsuitsi,t
Social Rating Bin 2i,t−1 -0.128 -0.050 0.116 0.321*
(0.080) (0.085) (0.178) (0.166)
Social Rating Bin 3i,t−1 -0.174 -0.134 0.112 0.231
(0.106) (0.108) (0.209) (0.204)
Social Rating Bin 4i,t−1 0.085 -0.001 0.248 0.284
(0.167) (0.147) (0.377) (0.361)
Total Lawsuitsi,t−1 0.216*** 0.124***
(0.007) (0.008)
Social Lawsuitsi,t−1 0.436*** 0.235***
(0.049) (0.051)
Controls? No Yes No Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8262 8262 8262 8262
Adj. R2 0.355 0.407 0.189 0.260
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Environmental and Social Ratings and Negative CSR-related News. This table
reports the estimation results of regressions where the dependent variable is the Reputational
Risk Index (RRI), a news-based measure of CSR in the following year. Standard errors,
clustered by three-digit SIC codes, are reported in parentheses. Significance at the ten
percent level is given by *; at the five percent level **, at the one percent level ***.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Negative CSR Negative CSR Negative CSR Negative CSR
Newsi,t Newsi,t Newsi,t Newsi,t
Env. Rating Bin 2i,t−1 0.588 -0.140
(0.431) (0.370)
Env. Rating Bin 3i,t−1 2.335*** 0.564
(0.536) (0.429)
Env. Rating Bin 4i,t−1 5.778*** 1.384**
(0.724) (0.595)
Soc. Rating Bin 2i,t−1 -0.948** -0.146
(0.477) (0.397)
Soc. Rating Bin 3i,t−1 -1.267** -0.491
(0.628) (0.482)
Soc. Rating Bin 4i,t−1 -0.204 -0.579
(1.073) (0.832)
Negative CSR Newsi,t−1 0.659*** 0.417** 0.689*** 0.419***
(0.027) (0.030) (0.027) (0.030)
Controls? No Yes No Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4326 4326 4326 4326
Adj. R2 0.640 0.704 0.633 0.704
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Appendix H: Corporate Badness Ratings Based On Two Inputs
Corporate Badness (CB) Environmental Ratings (based on penalties and law-
suits only)and Negative CSR-related News. This table reports the estimation results
of regressions where the dependent variable is the Reputational Risk Index (RRI), a news-
based measure of incidents related to corporate social responsibility (i.e. December of the
following year). Standard errors, clustered by three-digit SIC codes, are reported in paren-
theses. Significance at the ten percent level is given by *; at the five percent level **, at the
one percent level ***.
(1) (2)
Negative CSR-related Negative CSR-related
Newsi,t Newsi,t
CB Environmental Ratingi,t−1 0.676* 0.559*
(0.352) (0.336)
Negative CSR-related Newsi,t−1 0.668*** 0.430***
(0.022) (0.025)
Controls? No Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes




Corporate Badness (CB) Environmental Ratings (based on news and lawsuits)
and Future Regulatory Violations. This table reports the estimation results of regres-
sions where the dependent variables are 1) log values of total penalties assessed through
regulatory action (both civil and criminal) in the U.S. and 2) log values of environmental.
Explanatory variables are lagged by one year. Standard errors, clustered by three-digit SIC
codes, are reported in parentheses. Significance at the ten percent level is given by *; at the
five percent level **, at the one percent level ***.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Total Environmental Environmental
Penaltiesi,t Penaltiesi,t Penaltiesi,t Penaltiesi,t
CB Environmental Ratingi,t−1 0.244*** 0.141*** 0.169*** 0.138***
(0.072) (0.044) (0.033) (0.030)
Total Penaltiesi,t−1 0.395*** 0.242***
(0.107) (0.071)
Environmental Penaltiesi,t−1 0.011 0.006
(0.026) (0.042)
Controls? No Yes No Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7762 5553 7762 5553
R2 0.257 0.259 0.137 0.158
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Corporate Badness (CB) Environmental Ratings (based on penalties and news)
and Litigation. This table reports the estimation results of regressions where the dependent
variables are the number of lawsuits in the following year. Standard errors, clustered by
three-digit SIC codes, are reported in parentheses. No firm characteristics from previously
are included as controls. Significance at the ten percent level is given by *; at the five
percent level **, at the one percent level ***. For these negative binomial models, the
adjusted McFadden R-squared is reported.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Total Environmental Environmental
Lawsuitsi,t Lawsuitsi,t Lawsuitsi,t Lawsuitsi,t
CB Environmental Ratingi,t−1 0.375*** 0.005 0.614*** -0.013
(0.083) (0.048) (0.177) (0.171)
Total Lawsuitsi,t−1 0.353*** 0.226***
(0.015) (0.015)
Environmental Lawsuitsi,t−1 -0.207 -0.931*
(0.479) (0.484)
Controls? No Yes No Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7762 5553 7762 5553
R2 0.394 0.431 0.427 0.501
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Corporate Badness (CB) Social Ratings (based on penalties and lawsuits) and
Negative CSR-related News. This table reports the estimation results of regressions
where the dependent variable is the Reputational Risk Index (RRI), a news-based measure
of incidents related to corporate social responsibility (i.e. December of the following year).
Standard errors, clustered by three-digit SIC codes, are reported in parentheses. Significance
at the ten percent level is given by *; at the five percent level **, at the one percent level
***.
(1) (2)
Negative CSR-related Negative CSR-related
Newsi,t Newsi,t
CB Social Ratingi,t−1 2.426*** 1.407**
(0.626) (0.644)
Negative CSR-related Newsi,t−1 0.659*** 0.428***
(0.021) (0.025)
Controls? No Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes




Corporate Badness (CB) Social Ratings (based on lawsuits and news) and Fu-
ture Regulatory Violations. This table reports the estimation results of regressions where
the dependent variables are 1) log values of total penalties assessed through regulatory ac-
tion (both civil and criminal) in the U.S. and 2) log values of social. Explanatory variables
are lagged by one year. Standard errors, clustered by three-digit SIC codes, are reported in
parentheses. Significance at the ten percent level is given by *; at the five percent level **,
at the one percent level ***.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Total Social Social
Penaltiesi,t Penaltiesi,t Penaltiesi,t Penaltiesi,t
CB Social Ratingi,t−1 0.327*** 0.185*** 0.036*** 0.023***
(0.082) (0.046) (0.010) (0.007)
Total Penaltiesi,t−1 0.369*** 0.238***
(0.095) (0.070)
Social Penaltiesi,t−1 0.066** 0.090**
(0.033) (0.041)
Controls? No Yes No Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7762 5553 7762 5553
R2 0.259 0.264 0.067 0.110
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Corporate Badness (CB) Social Ratings (based on penalties and news) and
Litigation. This table reports the estimation results of regressions where the dependent
variables are the number of lawsuits in the following year. Standard errors, clustered by
three-digit SIC codes, are reported in parentheses. Significance at the ten percent level is
given by *; at the five percent level **, at the one percent level ***. For these negative
binomial models, the adjusted McFadden R-squared is reported.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Total Social Social
Lawsuitsi,t Lawsuitsi,t Lawsuitsi,t Lawsuitsi,t
CB Social Ratingi,t−1 0.340*** -0.001 0.423*** -0.207
(0.058) (0.078) (0.064) (0.138)
Total Lawsuitsi,t−1 0.349*** 0.226***
(0.015) (0.015)
Social Lawsuitsi,t−1 0.502*** 0.170***
(0.111) (0.004)
Controls? No Yes No Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7762 5553 7762 5553
R2 0.393 0.431 0.315 0.393
131
Appendix I: Robustness Check with Firm Fixed Effects
Robustness Check on the Impact on Environmental, Social, and Corporate Governance Ratings from a
Government Clampdown on Greenwashing. This table reports the estimation results of regressions where the dependent
variables are environmental, social, and corporate governance ratings from 2012 to 2013. Around the end of 2012, the Federal
Trade Commission enacted a ruling that was aimed at curtailing unfair or deceptive claims by businesses related to sustainability
and the environment. The policy targeted marketing information as conveyed to consumers. Standard errors clustered by
industry are reported in parentheses. B2C is equal to 1 if firm i belongs to the treated group, i.e. business-to-consumer industry
j. Significance at the ten percent level is given by *; at the five percent level **, at the one percent level ***.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Env. Ratingi,t Env. Ratingi,t Soc. Ratingi,t Soc. Ratingi,t Gov. Ratingi,t Gov. Ratingi,t
B2Cj x PostPeriodt -0.625** -0.606** -0.494** -0.475** -0.170 -0.131
(0.242) (0.241) (0.229) (0.237) (0.668) (0.660)
Controls? No Yes No Yes No Yes
Year FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1875 1875 1875 1875 1874 1874
Adj. R-squared 0.765 0.768 0.565 0.569 0.394 0.402
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